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Foucault, Power and the Modern Panopticon
Introduction
My thesis examines the question of how Foucault’s disciplinary modalities of power,
especially panopticism, have evolved over time, both in a historical context but also how they
have rapidly changed in the decades following Foucault’s death. In this time, mass surveillance
has become a norm in developed countries, through both the proliferation of overt measures like
security cameras but also more subtle and invasive means like data trawling, wherein
governments, corporations and other powerful entities are able to comb through large volumes of
data on specific people or larger demographics in order to gather information on them and exert
control over them. Much has been written on Foucault’s writings on panopticism and much has
been written on the topic of mass surveillance. However, I found the literature that links these
two concepts was fairly sparse, and so the purpose of my thesis is to bridge that gap and show
that the modern information panopticon has taken Foucault’s idea of panoptic architecture and
made it into an omnipresent and insidious institution. So, over the course of my thesis I will
strive to answer the question of how the transformation of panoptic disciplinary power has
changed to a more decentralized apparatus that takes the strengths of panoptic power and
distributes those checks on behavior throughout society. Because the panopticon has moved
beyond prisons and workplaces and now encapsulates society as a whole, it is important to view
society through a more panoptic lens. The same ethical concerns that were raised when Bentham
initially proposed his panoptic prison, that it was inhumane or that it would lead to madness
among the subjects, now we must hold up these concerns to society as a whole, because the eye
of the Inspector is now on all of us.
In Marcelo Hoffman’s essay “Disciplinary Power” he offers a digestible overview of
Foucault’s disciplinary model, which he introduces as “produc[ing] an organic individuality by
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exerting control over bodily activities” (Hoffman, 29). In disciplinary power, Foucault breaks
down people to the idea of “bodies”, wherein people are subjected to the modalities of power and
become part of the disciplinary system. The ideal for the hierarchal power is to have docile
bodies, i.e. bodies that do what they are told in as expedient a manner as possible. Hoffman
argues that the body is subjected “first, through division of time into distinct segments, such as
periods of practice or training; second, through the organization of these segments into a plan
proceeding from the simplest elements, such as the positioning of the fingers in military exercise;
third, through the ascription of an end to these segments in the form of an exam, and, finally,
through the production of a series that assigns exercises to each individual” (Hoffman 31) Put
another way, classical panopticism breaks down what differentiates people from those around
them to make them more easily molded and made to fit a specific image that is most beneficial to
the reigning hierarchic power. Panopticism both begs the question while simultaneously hopes to
keep us from questioning “What individuates this individual? The panoptic gaze objectified the
subject, making it a text, an unwieldy collection of file folders united under the aegis of a name”
(Schmelzer 130). Her lens is strictly limited to how panopticism affect collegiate eduction in
how it “enable[s] meticulous control over the network of power relations that produce and
sustain the truth claims of an institution by means of economical surveillance.” (Schmelzer 127)
However, the points that she raises have far wider effects than simply pedagogy, and while
Schmelzer does recognize that, she does not draw it out any further. She goes onto to say that the
panoptic gaze of the institution “multiples and mystifies the visible and centered gaze of the
machine into the countless instances of observation of a mechanism. Its operation is distributed
to every body in a system of power in a system of power relations that constitute an institution.”
(Schmelzer 128)
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The Modern Panopticon and its Application
The panopticon and panoptic theory has been used throughout history to help the
empowered control populations and modify their behaviors. In Timothy Mitchell’s “Colonizing
Egypt”, he talks at length about the Foucaultian principles used to bring many aspects of
Egyptian society into line. Settlements were set up with modular frames, to be reconstructed to
fit the spacial needs of the inhabitants, and the Lancaster schools that molded young men for
military service via intense adherence to daily rituals and social controls. They were told how to
sit and stand, and kept to a rigid timetable that stripped away any sense of individuality, and the
text presents a very well-documented case of historic panopticism in the traditional sense, where
the gaze is a very physical, tangible one and the hierarchal power structure is in evidence.
However, my thesis argues that the modern conception of panopticism is more subtle in
its operation, dictating the way we behave and forcing us to conform to norms in such a way that
we are never aware of the control it has over us. The panopticon no longer exists as a large
watchtower in the center of a circular prison, it has been recast in security cameras and
algorithms, police presence and data trawlers. “The counterpart to the central observation tower
has become a video screen. The web of windows is replaced by procedures for data entry such as
microprocessors built into operating equipment, or the control interfaces that record operator
inputs, or daily system updates provided by craftsworkers in their remote field sites” (Zuboff,
323) What Zuboff argues in her book “In the Age of the Smart Machine” is that the Benthamite
model of the panopticon is woefully outdated and we can no longer look for it only in places of
overt institutional control. Zuboff mainly confines her text to the evolutions of workplace, but I
would argue that it goes far beyond that, though it offers a very good starting point. “Bentham’s
panopticon relied upon the materials and techniques of his day to create a structure that could

4
autonomously reproduce an individualized social control, providing a central authority with
certain knowledge of an institutional population through the architectural invention of universal
transparency. […] The central principle of continuous observation made possible by technical
arrangements was to influence the administrative and architectural orientation of bureaucratic
organizations from schools, to hospitals, to workplaces in which individuals are taken up as
unique problems to be managed and measured against appropriate norms” (Zuboff 322). She
goes on to say how systems of information technology that are used to record and display human
behaviors allow for unprecedented transparency to the lives of those in the system to those
looking in. Mostly Zuboff uses this to frame her argument of managerial oversight, though even
in this some examples of the insidious institutional power can be seen. Through her interviews
with plant managers and supervisors, the text weighs the advantages of having mass surveillance
and data collection against the potential ethical questions it raises along with taking power from
those same overseers. This introduces another panoptic principle that my thesis will look at, in
that while panopticism is hierarchic, there is no one at the top of the hierarchy. The managers are
controlled by their plant systems the same way the workers are, and in the wider panoptic sense,
even those that are on the outside watching are still being watched by someone higher up the
chain of command, and anyone who is ostensibly at the top still has expectations projected onto
them and must modify their behavior in certain ways to conform to those expectations.
A similar argument is raised by Reg Whitaker’s “The End of Privacy”, and he too draws
on Foucaultian and panoptic principles expressly. He takes pains to explain that the Benthamite
conception of panoptic power is woefully outdated and that the march of technologic and
sociologic processes have moved past what Bentham saw as the ideal social control mechanism.
Whitaker writes that “the panoptic technology spread from specialized, enclosed institutions to
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administrative authorities that organized these institutions and finally to state apparatuses whose
major, if not exclusive function is to assure that discipline reigns over society as a whole”
(Whitaker 37), meaning the organized police forces. He, like Zuboff, also talks about how
managers and people in higher corporate positions bend panoptic modalities to suit their
interests, citing the example of Henry Ford forming a Gestapo to monitor his plant employees in
their off hours, a force he appropriately called the “Sociology Department” (Whitaker 39).
Whitaker eventually moves onto a discussion of the panoptic state, and how surveillance is
necessary in the modern world for a state to survive. He introduces the idea of the panoptic state
that Mitchell showed in practical application in “Colonizing Egypt”, but whereas Mitchell
explained how the panoptic state exercised institutional control, Whitaker explains why the
panoptic state does this.
Later in his text, he raises the interesting point that the modern panopticon differs from
the original conception in two distinct ways. The first is that it is decentralized, which has been
discussed at length in other texts, but far more interestingly for the purpose of this thesis, that
those who are subjected to the panopticon are subjected consensually. “At the very core of the
Benthamite idea was power rigorously centered, the architectural embodiment of godlike
sovereign authority radiating out from the Inspector’s command and control center. But this
conceptualization is technologically obsolete by the end of the twentieth century. Bentham
required this centralized architectural structure because he had no technology of surveillance
other than the unassisted human eye. The new information technologies offer the potential for
real rather than faked omniscience” (Whitaker 140). He goes on to say the individuals have been
rendered visible in ways that someone in the eighteenth century could never even have dreamed
of, and are now subjected to a far more metaphoric gaze that manifests as more than just a visual
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one. He also discusses how, in counterpoint to other sources that decry mass CCTV surveillance,
in many cases the people subjected to panoptic power welcome the increased surveillance as it
facilitates daily life and convenience, enhances security and empowers consumers. He does not
shy away from the negative effects that are discussed at greater length elsewhere, but raises the
point that modern society has entered into a social contract where those perceived breaches of
privacy are considered to be the price we pay to be safe and ensure our continued security. As he
says, where once the fear was that Big Brother was watching us, the now commonly held
perception is that Big Brother is watching out for us. It becomes easier for us to forget that we
are under observation, because the watchtower has been deconstructed. While in the Benthamite
panopticon the prisoners were very aware of the surveillance they were under, the modern
panopticon has done away with that. Its decentralized nature discourages self-surveillance
because it allows its subjects to forget that they are under surveillance at all.
Mass Electronic Surveillance
Many texts have been written since the dawn of the digital age about the use of mass
surveillance and the questionable ethics of mass surveillance, though very little work has been
done connecting them to Foucaultian principles. In Beatrice Larsen’s text “Setting the Watch”,
she examines the ethics of widespread usage of CCTV and its ethical quandaries. She devotes a
chapter to discussing its applications in crime prevention and deterrence. However, she is of the
opinion that individual rights and privacies trump the social benefits of mass CCTV presence.
She also argues that that CCTV compromises the public’s right to anonymity, and the close ties
between government and corporations allow for unprecedented and unconstitutional access to
data, and that access expands daily. However, she does present several arguments in which mass
surveillance may have a legitimate role in crime prevention and that the sacrifice of personal
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freedom and rights to privacy counterbalance the positive effect that the gaze of the cameras can
have in deterring potential criminals. She takes pains to weigh the right to privacy and free
speech over the at times draconian measures used in CCTV surveillance.
In Beatrice Edwards’s “Rise of the American Corporate Security State”, the author
examines the correlation between government surveillance and corporate tracking, and how the
line between the two has increasingly become blurred. She devotes two chapters to explaining
how this kind of surveillance and tracking is unconstitutional and argues that the systemic
corruption that enables data trawling and data harvesting will lead to another economic collapse.
The text is a bit more sensationalist than it necessarily has to be (its subtitle is “Six Reasons to
Be Afraid”) but for all that it is anti-surveillance propaganda, it does raise valid points on the
nature of surveillance and the unethical nature of that monitoring. She also deals with the topic
of Edward Snowden and the NSA leaks. In her first chapter, Edwards lays out the many ways
that mass panic gripped the security and surveillance arms of the government in the days
following Snowden’s leaks. Far less even handed than Larsen, Edwards acknowledges her bias
early on by noting that she works for a political nonprofit that does not take kindly to her emails
being scanned and coded, and also notes the ethical problems journalists face if they feel they no
longer have freedom of speech or the ability to keep their at-times-sensitive sources anonymous.
One of the ways I will be examining the modern conception of panopticism what effects
the Edward Snowden NSA leaks had on the panoptic infrastructure as a whole. The debate over
Snowden tends to fall into an ethical realm, whether or not he was justified in his actions and
whether or not he is a traitor or a patriot, or it is used to frame the debate of whether or not our
safety is worth the price of our liberty. However, I will be examining the Snowden effect from a
different angle, namely, how his leaks have changed the panoptic landscape and the relationship
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we as a society now have with panoptic disciplinary power. I will be arguing that because he
made the public more aware of the NSA’s operations and the extent of their surveillance, he
reinstated a culture of self-surveillance that had been lost in the rise of the digital age. Because
the process of gathering data on subjects and observing them had become so automated, the
concept of a panoptic “watchtower” has become passé, despite that watchtower simply moving
to a more decentralized and less tangible form. To illustrate this point, I will be working with
statements Snowden himself has released since his blowing the whistle in summer 2013, various
newspaper and magazine articles and “No Place to Hide”, the book published by Glenn
Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who Snowden initially contacted to break the story. I will
mostly be using these texts to illustrate the background of the Snowden case and the response of
various world powers in the immediate aftermath. It is telling that Snowden’s name now evokes
panoptic imagery, the Orwellian eye in the watchtower, but very little has been written about his
relation to panoptic power and how he changed that relationship, despite many publications
dropping the term “panopticism” into articles as a buzzword. But the fact alone that his very
name now brings to mind panopticism means that he has changed the public’s relationship to it
and made it something far closer to the cultural consciousness than it was even a year before his
leaks means something. Though the technologies being used and the volume of data being
collected remain largely unchanged from 2010 to 2013 when Snowden went published (and even
2013 to the present), public interest in those forms of power has dramatically increased since
then, and the ways they respond to that conception of power has changed with their awareness of
it.
Conclusion
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Many of the sources I have examined for this thesis have dealt with the themes of
panopticism or of mass surveillance, but they have done very little to connect those two themes.
Even in contemporary works dealing with Foucaultian discourse, I have found very little linking
the idea of mass surveillance with panoptic power, and so my thesis is an attempt to further the
discourse on that subject. We as a society can no longer simply ignore that we are being watched
by our governments and by massive multinational institutions. Regardless of the supposed
altruism that this mass warrantless surveillance promotes, often this surveillance is
unconstitutional and in violation of the spirit of the law in regards to American rights. The idea
of the panopticon has evolved from its original overt social architecture intentions, and yet very
little has been said as we lose more and more of our freedom to a metaphoric all-seeing eye. The
aim of this thesis is to address the effect of modern panoptic surveillance on the present state of
global security and the ramifications that such widespread surveillance has had on personal
liberties. This thesis will argue that Foucaultian panopticism has evolved from models that were
primarily focused on architectural and institutional surveillance into an apparatus that permeates
society on every level and has, in pursuit of making society more secure rendered it less safe.
When something like Snowden’s leaks happen, we as a society should no longer be
surprised. Big Brother has been watching us for a long time, it is only just recently that we
started to care. Panopticism is a modality of social control, and while its original intent was to be
an overt method of control the evolution of technology and the progression of humanity into the
digital age has entirely changed the ways this power is exercised. It is now more subtle than ever,
and while we are told by the media each day that our data is being mined and we are being
watched by vague yet menacing government agencies, we have been simultaneously conditioned
not to care or even pay attention. The mentality of “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” only goes so
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far. Essentially, the aim of my thesis is not to show that perhaps we do have things to hide, only
that we as a society ought to realize that nothing is hidden anymore.
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Chapter 1: Foucault and Panopticism
It is difficult to begin any kind of discourse on Foucault and disciplinary power without
addressing the opening of “Discipline and Punish”. The text opens with a graphic account of an
18th century execution. Damiens, a man accused of regicide, is carted to scaffold where “the
flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand,
holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt away with sulphur and, on
those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin,
wax and sulphur melted together” (Foucault, pg 3) and finally, his body was drawn and
quartered. This brutal scene sets the stage for Foucault’s discourse on the evolution of
disciplinary power, and was not included in his original text solely in the interest of
sensationalism. The execution itself was done for the benefit of the spectators, a tangible
example of the swift and brutal justice of the state. However, these public executions were soon
done away with as prisons were created to contain and keep society’s undesirables out of the
public gaze and capital punishment was changed from a public spectacle to something handled
by the state behind closed doors.
Panopticism in Brief
“Discipline and Punish” lays out the ways in which discipline is implemented, and has
been implemented throughout the past several centuries. Foucault writes on controlling
populations and workforces and normalizing things to make people, whom he refers to as
“bodies” once they have entered the disciplinary apparatus, more docile. The focus of this thesis
will be on one specific modality of disciplinary power that Foucault uses, that of panopticism.
The original idea of the panoptic prison, or panopticon, was designed by the English social
theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century as a prison institution in which one guard would
be able to observe all prisoners, but the prisoners themselves would not be able to see the guard
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or each other. The panoptic structure for the Benthamite prison was a circular atrium with cells
along the perimeter facing inwards, and with a single watchtower in the middle where the
watchman would be able to observe without being observed. In this set up, the prisoners could be
watched at all times, but they would not know whether or not there was someone in the
watchtower to observe them. As they were subjected to this gaze, they would modify their
behavior and be less likely to instigate trouble. The panopticon ensures economy in both
personnel and time and efficiency in both monitoring the subjects and in the application of its
observers, allowing for continuous function and a near automatic operative mechanism
(Foucault, pg 206). Eventually, the self-disciplinary measures introduced by the panopticon
could be used to drastically simplify measures in a prison, with no external force or overt method
of disciplinary power being necessary. The old dungeons and gaols could be replaced with a
simple, economic and geometric structure. “Bentham was surprised that panoptic institutions
could be so light: there were no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that was
needed was that the separations should be clear and the openings well arranged” (Foucault pg
202).
Bentham conceived of the panopticon as a model for a prison, but his aspirations were
ultimately far more lofty than that. He envisioned the panoptic model taking hold in schools,
hospitals, asylums and the military, eventually permeating every level of society. While the
panopticon never became anything more than a conceptual model in Bentham’s lifetime (and in
fact, in following very few prisons and institutions can claim to be made based off the panoptic
model), Foucault argues that the position that the panoptic form did permeate society, if not in
the way Bentham expected. The panopticon “must not be understood as a dream building: it is
the diagram of a mechanism of power in its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any
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obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it
is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use”
(Foucault, pg 205). Foucault shows that while the panopticon has not necessarily been
implemented in the way Bentham originally proposed, it has made its way subtly into the cultural
consciousness and has been adopted as a norm and accepted as a process used to protect citizens
and work in our best interests, even if at times this is not the case.
The Panoptic Prison
Foucault goes on to define the purpose of the panopticon as he views it, an architectural
apparatus for “creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises
it” (Foucault, pg 201), essentially creating a system where the incarcerated bodies (or in the case
of schools, hospitals, etc. the subjected bodies) where the modality of power is borne by them
but also projected onto themselves, by themselves. In the physical panoptic prison that Bentham
envisioned, the prisoner would be unable to escape the unwavering gaze of the central
watchtower, but at the same time would be unable to tear his gaze away. While he would never
know whether or not he was actually being watched, due to a cleverly designed network of
blinds, partitions and twisting passages in the watchtower itself, he would be aware that there is
the potential to be watched and that any act of misconduct could bring about swift justice and
retribution. His isolation from other prisoners in the system, both in the literal and psychological
sense, make any attempts to go against the system unlikely as his individuality is broken down
and any tendencies that go against the norm are stripped away.
Foucault’s theory on docile bodies is primarily intended to be a way to examine a labor
force and to keep checks on that labor force, though he is clear to make the distinction that
domination of bodies under the disciplinary power structure was not the same thing as slavery, as
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it was not based on the appropriation of bodies against their will and conscripted into work,
rather “the elegance of discipline lay in the fact that it could dispense with this costly and violent
relation by obtaining effects of utility at least as great” (Foucault, pg 137). The “bodies” are
inducted into a system where they give up some of their rights in exchange for the right to work,
and has been developed over decades and centuries of political thought. These processes and
modalities of power have been developed in workhouses and schools for centuries, and have
always been adopted in response to a particular need, be it a way to combat the spread of a
virulent disease, to expedite the growth of a military power or allow for an increase in industrial
productivity.
The historic panoptic model is founded on the disciplinary concept of enclosure, keeping
society’s less desirable elements enclosed and out of the public view and to make those same
elements feel disparate. They are partitioned off, and the forming of groups is discouraged both
by architecture and by psychological controls. The aim of this partitioning is to “establish
presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful
communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each
individual” (Foucault, pg 143). It also draws its inspiration from Bentham’s idea of an all-seeing
eye of God, that the perfect disciplinary apparatus would be able to see everything constantly
with a singular gaze. The perfect panoptic structure would have “a central point [that] would be
both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that
must be known; a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a center towards which all gazes
would be turned” (Foucault, pg 173), ensuring that those within the panopticon would always be
made intimately aware of the fact that they were under observation and that the system had
power over them.
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What makes panoptic and disciplinary power so effective is that it normalizes the
judgment of its subjects. Everything in the system is to be made uniform, and the subjected
bodies, once inducted, will come to accept the disciplinary measures as the norm. Their
uniformity leads to further docility, and they become more compliant to the suggestive nature of
the disciplinary model. However, going hand in hand with this uniformity is also a concerted
effort by those placed higher in the overall hierarchy to divide the subjected bodies by making
them feel more isolated from each other and to keep them from organizing. This is done through
both overt physical means, by way of partitions in living and workspaces, and also through more
subtle coercive means, by keeping subjects busy with tasks that require just enough to focus to
prevent the mind from wandering. However, what sets the disciplinary model apart from the
punitive model described in the opening scene of “Discipline and Punish” is that disciplinary
power is essentially corrective. Early models of disciplinary power used the threat of retribution
or death to force populations into compliance, whereas later models embraced a reformatory and
corrective ideal, with the end result changing from simply removing the criminal elements from
society to instead rehabilitating those same elements and putting them to a more productive use.
Foucault points out that the prison is not intended to be a deterrent to crime, and the institution of
prisons does not lead to a decrease in crime in any significant capacity. The threat of
incarceration or physical punishment means little if the people in question have no recourse but
to resort to crime, so both Bentham and Foucault put forth their penitentiary model as a social
reform strategy. While members of society who were considered to be dangerously unstable or
beyond the point of salvation could be contained and observed, others who were found to be
guilty could, through their time in captivity, be taught a trade and put to serve society’s ends so
that when they were released (if they ever were), they could go on to become more productive
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members of society than when they were incarcerated, and reduce their chances of being
incarcerated again.
The Panoptic Society
At its most basic level, the panoptic modality of power can be understood as a pyramid.
The small, concentrated cell of those who hold power remains above the larger mass of the labor
force, and from their lofty perch they supervise the tasks they impose on the masses. The “body”
of the populace is broken down to a machine and reduced to a political “force”, and that force is
maximized at the least cost for the most useful result. Panoptic power is at its heart a hierarchic
power structure, with everyone in the system subjected to someone else who is higher in the
hierarchy in question. However, what the pyramid metaphor does not fully address is that in the
panoptic model, no one is at the top of the hierarchy. Even if one was to be at the top of the
prison system (i.e. the supervisor), while that person would hold nearly absolute power in the
prison environment, they would also be subjected to their own supervisors, who are in turn
subjected to the hierarchic power of their supervisor, and so on.
The true genius of panoptic power and the panoptic society is how simple it is to make
the panoptic society the established norm. By indoctrinating a population into panoptic
modalities from an early age, they become docile and accept the panoptic institutions as
necessary. Timothy Mitchell’s “Colonizing Egypt” gives examples of how the panoptic society
was implemented to better establish colonial rule in Egypt in the 19th century, by applying
panoptic modalities of power throughout all levels of society. Entire villages were built by the
government on a modular level, where living spaces could be adjusted depending on the size of
the family living in the unit. These villages were centralized and made it a simple matter for the
government officials to track populations and their comings and goings, along with having a
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presence in the daily lives of the citizens that was both subtle in its manifestation and overt in its
exercise of power. Boys were enrolled in Lancaster schools in preparation for entering the
military, where discipline was instilled via rigorous daily routine where each waking moment
was expressly carved out and regimented. Physical activity and discipline were used to make
them pliable and docile, and inure them into the disciplinary model. Though they were educated
and trained together, they were psychologically isolated from each other to better make them
more compliant to disciplinary power.
This breaking up of people serves to create divides between them psychologically.
Whereas in a true panopticon, prisoners are isolated by the construction of the cells, this method
of isolation is impractical and often unethical in the larger world. The panoptic model ensures
that bodies are isolated psychologically instead. This is done by putting up walls between them
and the outside world, but also between themselves. By keeping the bodies monadic, they kept
them docile. There was little opportunity for rebellion or discord to grow under such conditions,
and this only served to reinforce the panoptic power structure. In an enclosed space, there is little
room for individuality, but the bodies subjected in this way are allowed to preserve the illusion
of individual expression. This keeps them docile, for they still feel they are in control of their
own actions (when in fact the opposite is the case) and revolutionary sentiment is kept down.
The use of timetables regiment a daily schedule and break time into a precise ration of activities,
giving each of the bodies a specific place to be at every minute of every day. Foucault quotes
Bentham, saying “There is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of
new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if they are patients, there is no danger of
contagion; if they are madmen there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if
they are schoolchildren there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are
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workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow the
rate of work” (Foucault, pg 201) to illustrate Bentham’s vision of a society-wide panopticon and
the aspirations he had for it.
For Foucault, the idea of panoptic power is vested in the idea of self-surveillance, and
this kind of domination is encouraged by disciplinary apparatuses but it is imposed on oneself.
Though the worker or prisoner feels in control of their own actions and feels like they are the
ones deciding to follow the rules laid out by their respective systems, in fact they are being
subjected to various psychological pressures to encourage their cooperation with the system. By
doing so, they become more aware of their own behaviors and more likely to correct themselves
without the need of an outside influence. Foucault notes that this sort of behavior being used on a
widespread scale can be traced back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution when it was
necessary for industrialists to separate the workers from what they were making and reduce them
to more malleable parts in their grand design. By encouraging self-surveillance, factory owners
could control their workforces at a minimum cost to themselves, because their workforces were
continually correcting their own behaviors in order to fit their prescribed role and to keep their
jobs.
The Downfall of the Panopticon and the Panoptic Utopia
Many of Jeremy Bentham’s contemporaries agreed with his view that “labor would
inculcate habits of honest industry and [their] solution was to attach several penitentiary houses
to the dockyards around [England] where the convicts could be sent to work on naval repairs
such as rope making, mending casks and sail making. These prisons would have the dual purpose
of employing convicts and stopping peculation and pilfering from naval stores” (Semple, pg
260). Under this system, convicts would be dispersed throughout the country, preventing
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unmanageable concentrations of prisoners, and these prisoners would be employed in simple
work that was in reparation to the society they had injured. Bentham’s detractors found this to be
a far superior system for incarceration in opposition to the panopticon. Robert Edington, another
social theorist of the time, would write “Let me ask how, in a circular iron cage could any of
these great objects be effected? In what manner would Mr. Bentham work up the twice laid rope;
suppose a hawser of 140 fathoms, run metal, forge anchors, roll copper, in the circle of an iron
cage” (Semple, pg 261). In time, Edington’s ideas for a penitentiary system would also be
rejected by the government.
Perhaps the key reason Bentham’s panoptic model was never adopted in his lifetime, and
certainly never fully realized as he envisioned it since, is largely due to the fact that it is based
off ideas that had just recently fallen out of vogue. The push to institutionalize the poor in
workhouses was a relic of the 1700s, and while the prevailing mores of thought that enabled the
workhouses to become a part of the fabric of society continued well into the 19th century (one
needs to look no further than the work of Charles Dickens and his “Sketches by Boz” for
evidence of that), many of the upper elements of society were seeking an alternative. The allseeing eye of the panopticon seemed a far too totalitarian measure for widespread
implementation, not to mention the various logistical and economic problems that would hamper
such an endeavor. However, the architectural concept of the panopticon went on to inspire many
of the penal buildings in America in the 19th and early 20th century. The Western penitentiary in
Pittsburgh was built in the 1820s and modeled on Bentham’s panopticon quite closely, but only
showcased the impractical nature of the original design and was demolished only ten years after
its creation. Later, in 1916, the construction of the panopticon was again attempted in the
Stateville penitentiary in Joliet. However, the designers failed to understand the idea of the
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unseen warden in Bentham’s original model, and so the nature of surveillance within the prison
soon developed into a cruel farce as the inmates could observe the guards’ every move. For all
that Bentham held lofty ideals, had his original panopticon been built, it would likely have failed
in many similar ways.
It must be noted that Bentham’s idea of a panopticon was heavily steeped in utopian
ideology, something that seems at times incongruous with Bentham’s historic portrayal as a dour
rationalist, and some scholars would argue that the prevailing pessimism about mankind in
Bentham’s works would make any such utopian ideology impossible or at the very least unlikely.
However, Bentham would reflect later in his life that he envisioned the panopticon as a device
through which he would reform and revolutionize the world (Semple, pg 288). One of Bentham’s
ultimate goals was to create a panopticon town, an entire self-sufficient construct that ran off the
panoptic model. Originally intended to be a penal colony, the panopticon town would not only
have a prison and workhouse, but also a farm to provide the material needs of the prisoners, with
female convicts preparing any livestock for the table in a conveyor-belt system, a precursor to
the assembly line production that Henry Ford would spread in the coming decades. There would
be a school, also running on the panoptic model, where urchins could be inducted into the system
early on and made to be productive. The only contact the inmates would have with the outside
world would be when they attended religious services. To be fair, for all that Bentham portrays
this as a utopian model of society, the limiting of contact from the outside world and the culture
of fear that such a system would cultivate are decidedly Orwellian, and likely why the British
government never allowed Bentham to undertake the project. While the panoptic utopia would
never be realized for Bentham, it found a spiritual successor in the spread of colonization
throughout the European empires, specifically in the Egyptian colonial occupation.
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The Historic Panopticon in Practice
Throughout the middle of the nineteenth century, the citizens of Egypt were inmates in
their own villages. Through a series of government ordinances, they were confined to their
districts and travel to other areas of the country was strictly limited and required one to go
through a convoluted system to obtain a series of papers, permits and passports, effectively
deterring most from attempting to try. Villagers were under surveillance day and night by the
military, and any goods produced by cultivating the land were summarily confiscated by
government officials and put into warehouses to be distributed later. Foucault takes a westerncentric view of disciplinary power, focusing on the effects of a panoptic society in a European
context, though “this focus has tended to obscure the colonizing nature of disciplinary power.
Yet the panopticon, the model institution whose geometric order and generalized surveillance
serve as a motif for this kind of power, was a colonial invention” (Mitchell, pg 35). The panoptic
model was used in the Foucaultian sense throughout the British colonial empire to keep the
native populations docile and convert their tribal systems into hegemonic capitalism.
The Egyptian government gathered up young men and made them into an organized
army, the first of its kind in Egypt. They were summarily indoctrinated into a system of
discipline that saturated their daily lives, from the time they woke up until they went to bed, and
even then was strictly ordered in a barrack model. Those who were not brought into the army
were set to work in Egypt’s fertile land on the banks of the Nile producing cotton and other
commodities for European consumers. “It was necessary to have their places carefully marked
out, their duty or quota exactly specified, and their performance continuously monitored and
reported” (Mitchell, pg 40). These farm workers were supervised throughout their periods of
labor, and when they were shepherded back to their villages they were likewise observed so that
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they could not escape or abandon their homes. “Each separate act was stipulated and supervised,
to coordinate every individual into a single economy of crops, money, and men” (Mitchell, pg
41). The very concept of the village itself became standardized, with each house (although
perhaps it is more accurate to call them “containers”) being exactly proportioned for the
minimum needs of its denizens, and each village was built under the same model plan, resulting
in a specifically ordered countryside of containers and those that they contained.
The true strength of this modular village lay in its overall flexibility. Because the housing
system contained a moveable system of partitions that made individual rooms into cells, partition
walls could be added or removed as the overseers saw fit. To accommodate a larger family a
partition could be removed, or to fit in two smaller families, a larger space could be further
subdivided. These cells could be multiplied or subtracted without ever compromising the simple
nature of the system or impeding the power of the inspectors. “This harmony of parts enabled a
reconstructed village to offer not just a better knowledge and control of its inhabitants, but the
possibility of coordinating them together in order to increase their productivity as a unit. Like the
army, the new village can be thought of as a machine, generating effort out of the interaction of
its individual parts” (Mitchell, pg 47).
Egypt also introduced the Lancaster school model that had been adopted in England in
the early 19th century to condition young men into disciplinary power. Like a factory floor, the
school used a single large room where the movements of the pupils was controlled via a whistle
or bell. Students would sit at benches, with each bench representing a class of eight to ten boys.
Instruction was done standing up, for the benefit of their physical health. The lessons were
punctuated with bursts of physical activity, and the intent of the schools was to prepare the boys
for entering the military service or the workforce. This model was widely used throughout
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English cities in areas with a heavy concentration of the working poor, and the English model
was espoused throughout its colonies. “The Lancaster model school was a system of perfect
discipline. Students were kept constantly moving from task to task, with every motion and every
space put to use. Each segment of time was regulated, so that at every moment a student was
either receiving instruction, repeating it, supervising or checking. It was a technique in which the
exact position and precise task of the individual at every moment was coordinated to perform in
accordance with the whole. Authority and obedience were diffused throughout the school,
implicating every individual in a system of order, the model of a perfect disciplinary society”
(Mitchell, pg 71).
Foucault asserts in “Discipline and Punish” that even though the physical panopticon was
never constructed, a metaphoric panoptic model has been permeating society since the industrial
revolution. The modern education system was established in the Industrial Revolution to groom
schoolchildren for a life of working in factories, to give them just enough knowledge to enter the
workforce and become productive, docile bodies. The regimented lifestyle of the modern school
system is not terribly far removed from the Lancaster model described in “Colonizing Egypt”,
with the only difference being a lesser focus on military fitness drills. Modern society still
grooms children to accept disciplinary power as a social norm and not to question the impacts of
a disciplinary modality on society in general. What Foucault asserts is that while the panopticon
was never physically built, it came to be in a far more metaphoric way.
The God in the Machine
Because the panoptic prison that Bentham envisioned was never constructed, he was
never able to put his social experiment of the panoptic society into practice. However, the
disciplinary measures that mark panoptic power were employed throughout the 19th century in
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many of the ways that Bentham himself had originally envisioned. While he was not credited
with their creation until many years after his death, the modalities of power he was eventually
credited with became instrumental in the spread of imperialism throughout the 19th century.
Populations were conditioned through disciplinary measures to become more docile and more
susceptible to hegemonic control. The overt presence of wardens and guards, i.e. people more
powerful than the subjected bodies, kept them in line and ensured they fulfilled their given tasks.
The all-seeing eye of the system permeated every aspect of their life, and because of this, they
became more aware of their own behavior. Because the threat of retributive that could come at
any time should any subjected body step out of line, those subjected over time become more
conscious of the rules of the system they are in and take pains to ensure that they follow those
rules, engaging in surveillance of their own against themselves, becoming instrumental in their
own domination and subjugation. This self-surveillance is a cornerstone of Foucaultian
disciplinary power.
An important tenant of the panoptic model is that it is founded on the idea of presenting
fiction as indisputable fact. This is most clearly seen in the idea of the omniscience of the warden
or observer. So long as they remain hidden, but still felt as a presence, they can be considered to
be able to see everything at once, and the inmates in the panopticon will have no knowledge to
the contrary. “The moment the inspector allows himself to be seen anywhere in the panopticon,
he loses his omnipresence in the eyes of those who can see him: those who can see him, can, of
course, tell whether his eyes are directed toward them; those who can see him thus can see they
are not being seen” (Bozovic, pg 9). In a “typical” prison system, the warden makes himself a
visible power structure, and when he is present the prisoners display the attitude of discipline for
him, though when he is not present they lapse into idleness. Therefore, in the panoptic model it is
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vital for the warden or guard to “expose himself to the eyes of the prisoners as little as possible:
all of his power over the prisoners derives from his invisibility, or more precisely, his invisible
omnipresence” (Bozovic, pg 9). Contrary to the traditional model, where it is assumed that
prisoners need to be in the presence of a guard, in the panopticon the behavior of the prisoners is
checked and they are deterred from further transgression by the absence of the guard, because in
this way they are made aware of the vague concept of the guard being present without knowing
where he actually turns his gaze. This elaborate fiction plays into Bentham’s role as a theologian
with the watcher in the panopticon acting as the eye of God. This elaborate fiction is vital to the
deterrent of transgression, for it makes the prisoners fear to do so because they fear bringing
down the wrath of a God-figure who could know their every move.
The idea of gaze is the key to the panopticon, both for those on the inside of the
watchtower and those without. As stated above, if the prisoners can see into the watchtower and
observe where their guards are and what part of the prison they are observing, the entire system
collapses because it is founded on faulty principles. The gaze of the observer takes on almost
superhuman qualities, as a “gaze and a voice that cannot be pinned down to any particular bearer
tend to acquire exceptional powers, and by themselves, as it were, constitute divine attributes”
(Bozovic, pg 11). In the Benthamite model, the inspector was hidden from the prisoners’ gaze by
a trick of lanterns that allowed the inside of his watchtower to be illuminated and to illuminate
the cells of his charges, allowing him to remain in one place and only a slight turn of his head or
body observe all under his charge. This of course raises the objection that if the inspector is only
a God-figure when he is invisible, and his all-seeing gaze is only empowered when he is unseen,
would not partial visibility weaken the strength of his gaze? “By no means, argues Bentham. The
inspector’s partial visibility in the translucent lantern does not allow the prisoner to determine
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whether the eye of the inspector is at the moment directed towards him any more than he can if
the inspector is not at all visible” (Bozovic, pg 13). The ideal state for the panoptic system would
be for every prisoner to be under observation from the watcher at all times, but as this is
fundamentally impossible, the solution is that prisoners must persist in the illusion that they are
being observed. The fiction of the all seeing eye is carried further by convincing the prisoners
that at every instant they could be under observation and reinforcing that fiction. After this
fiction has taken hold, the prisoners will then modify and mold their own behaviors because they
feel that they are under the gaze of their inspector, and any transgression he makes will be seen
and dealt with. They will “keep in [their] mind a list of [their] own transgression and calculate
the gravity of punishment that [they] will sooner or later have to suffer” (Bozovic, pg 17), and
any failure to act on the inspector’s part following a transgression will be interpreted as a deferral
of punishment. “Though the inspector may completely abandon surveillance, from this moment
on, each prisoner will believe that the inspector is preying upon him, whereas in truth each
prisoner is only preying upon himself. Thus, discipline is internalized, while the inspector
himself has become superfluous” (Bozovic, pg 17). Once the hammer of justice has been brought
down on one prisoner following a transgression, the presence of a warden in the panopticon is
entirely unnecessary, and any skeptics within the system will be converted to supplicants before
the all seeing eye. Ideally the inspector could leave the panopticon and allow it to continue to run
on its own.
Conclusion
The Benthamite conception of the panopticon as an overt social control does not
necessarily survive him. While it is clear that overt measure of power are key in the construction
of the panoptic society, Foucault and those who come after him see the panoptic model as better
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employed in ways that are less concrete and immediately visible. While the threat of being under
observation is undoubtedly present, the modern panopticon no longer relies on a central
watchtower or analogous power structure. In many cases, the intention has been to allow those in
the panoptic system to forget that they are under observation. The presence of surveillance
cameras has become ubiquitous in population centers but the cameras themselves have been
made to appear as subtle as possible, often blending into their surroundings. CCTV cameras have
been strategically designed to be overlooked, and society at large has been conditioned not to
notice them. On an certain level most people are aware they are being watched, but because the
presence of the cameras is made to be so unobtrusive, it is easy to forget they are there and to
drop the pretense of self-surveillance. Because the subjects no longer feel the panoptic gaze on
them, they are far less likely to respond in the same way as subjects in a traditional panopticon
because to them, the price to pay for not adhering to a norm is much less. Foucault’s theory on
panoptic power draws from the Benthamite architectural model, though it allows for panoptic
power to manifest in ways that are less overt and on a smaller scale. Foucault acknowledges that
Bentham’s theories have been adapted to fit modern society, and in fact much of “Discipline and
Punish” owes its discourse to Bentham’s conception of the prison and penal theories. Like
Bentham, he does not limit his panoptic discourse to simply a prison setting, instead applying it
to schools, asylums, hospitals and factories, though he largely sheds Bentham’s utopian
aspirations for the system. In the final section of “Discipline and Punish”, he asserts that the
prison is directly responsible for creating delinquents. By living in a society steeped in the
modalities of panoptic power, we have become conditioned to normalize our behavior for fear of
the retribution of the god in the machine. While the gaze of the all-seeing eye can deter criminal
behavior and promote a society that is, by and large, safer, though this comes at the expense of
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personal liberties. The spread of CCTV and society’s growing reliance on computerized data
over the past several decades has led to a system wherein any amount of personal data is
available to anyone who has the tools to look for it.
The idea of a panoptic society raises important ethical questions, not the least of which
being if it is worth the sacrifices that it requires. In an American context, the modern panopticon
could be in violation of our constitutional rights to freedom of expression. It is no longer a
question of if a panoptic society will be adopted, or even a matter of when. The panoptic society
exists, and we are currently living in it. However, the idea of the central watchtower has not held
over from Bentham’s original model, and while society is conditioned to accept the measures of
institutional control, we are likewise conditioned to overlook and normalize them. Our data is out
there. We are under observation almost constantly, both by way of a camera lens and by tracking
data. One must wonder if the price of living in a secure and technologically advanced society is
worth the price of personal freedom. But in the panopticon, you are given every indication that
you are free. If one has nothing to hide, we are told, then there is nothing to fear, a chilling echo
of Big Brother.
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Chapter 2: The Disciplinary Apparatus
Michel Foucault was a prolific philosopher, writing on a multitude of topics. Though his
work touches on disciplinary power, sexuality, genealogy, architecture and psychology, the great
unifying themes that characterize his method of thought are power and knowledge, and the
relationship between the two. In the Foucaultian view, the former controls and checks the latter.
Much of his work is also concerned with the concept of transgression, which is also linked to
power and knowledge, especially in a social context. Foucault’s view of disciplinary power was
used to train and condition populations to behave according to a series of prescribed norms.
Through the application and implementation of hierarchal power structures, the use of
normalizing judgment and the use of a collective gaze, Foucault outlines the basis of his
conception of disciplinary power exhibited through the architectural construct of the panopticon.
As outlined in the previous section, the panopticon is a disciplinary tool that separates and
subjugates its inmates and, in short, “imposes compulsory visibility upon those whom it subjects
to discipline, while those in power remain invisible” (Gordana, pg 86), causing the observed to
modify their behavior to better fit the norm of the prison itself. In short, “the machinery of power
articulates its effects of power with reference to a certain type of knowledge which is derived
from the same machinery and which in turn extends to and reinforces the effects of power”
(Kattakayam, pg 461). There can be no power without a constituent field of knowledge to shore
it up, and by the same token there is no knowledge that does not constitute a power relation. Or,
in even simpler terms, knowledge and power cannot exist in a vacuum independent of each
other.
The concept of the panoptic gaze was touched on in the preceding chapter, in the purely
physical sense of the physical panopticon prison, but it is just as relevant in the modern
metaphoric panopticon, and though the actual act of observation has changed, the theory behind
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it has not. The use of the term gaze is itself interesting, as it is an irregular translation from the
original French term that Foucault used, regard. “Gaze is used because “look” has the additional
connotation in English as the thing being observed” (Shumway, pg 52), changing the mechanics
of the phrase to at times refer to a more static action than Foucault intends, which is intended to
be a domination of the visualized object. Foucault also echoes Sartre in his discourse on gaze,
where for Sartre regard was translated as “to look”. “Sartre argued that to be caught by the look
of another is to be objectified and rendered a thing rather than an object or person, and as a result
to feel shamed, alienated, enslaved and even endangered by the other” (Shumway, pg 52) which
is itself the purpose of disciplinary power, to reduce the subject to a “body” rather than a person
in an attempt to dehumanize them and make them more susceptible to institutional control.
The function of the Benthamite gaze was to construct an elaborate fiction by which one
subjugates those beneath the observer in the power hierarchy and introduce an omnipotent god to
the powerful machine. The Foucaultian nature of gaze “is a matter of applying a language or a
mathematic to the thing seen so that it is constituted by the observer in his terms” (Shumway, pg
53). Though both present an implicit power relationship, Foucault linked the concept of the gaze
to a loss of freedom and autonomy by the subject, a truth that the historic physical panopticon
drove home by the simple fact of its existence. In the modern age, the power of the panopticon
has become more decentralized and subtle by placing eyes everywhere, but by making the bars
of the cage harder to define.
Punishment is no longer the swift, punitive justice that saw to the demise of Damiens the
regicide, and under the panoptic worldview “becomes more abstract, and thus its effectiveness
results from its inevitability, not from the intensity of its fatal experience” (Gordana, pg 91). The
aim of disciplinary power and panopticism specifically is to reduce the body to a political force
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at the lowest possible cost to generate a maximum return on utility, which has been incorporated
by the current capitalist economy and now the technique of submitting bodies to a hierarchal
structure has become the norm. At its heart, Foucault’s work is “less interested in power as a
property of agents. Rather, he focuses on how power operates through the way space is
organized, or through regimentation, or through the management of populations, or through
bureaucracy” (Hiley, pg 346). The aim of disciplinary power is not to achieve domination, but to
create an efficient system and reduce opposition within that system by way of a regulated regime
and through direct supervision. Disciplinary power is not ultimately held by any one person or
even group, rather it is a force to be wielded and brought to bear against a subjected mass, but no
one interest has complete mastery over it.
Enclosure and Normalization
Foucault’s body of work deals heavily with the subject of transgression in a variety of
forms. At its heart, transgression is to go against the established norms of the society the subject
finds themselves in, making them by definition abnormal. The practice of enclosure and isolation
is used to isolate the abnormal from the rest of society, either to be rehabilitated to make them
productive members of society again or, should that not be an option, to be taken out of the
social equation for the benefit of the whole. In Foucault’s system of disciplinary power, the
individuals are reduced to a political force and are intended to be exploited according to the best
possible use of their skills (Ransom, pg 46). This all sounds decidedly tyrannical and totalitarian,
not to mention anti-humanist. While normalization is one of the most effective instruments of
social control in the modern age, “normalization” itself is not intended to be seen in an inherently
negative way. “A norm is a standard of some kind that a multiplicity of individuals must reach
and maintain to perform certain tasks. Though Foucault is obviously playing a word game here,
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disciplines on this level have “norms” in a non-“normative” sense. If members of a group are to
be trained to do something, one way to do it is to establish standards that will act as performance
goals for each individual. […]In this way the individual is subordinated to this play of
fragmented gestures repeated by rote” (Ransom, pg 47). At its heart, normalization is just a tool
employed towards making a more productive society. In a factory environment, such procedures
can increase efficiency and generate more profit. Normalization as a concept only starts to
become insidious when it uses the above-mentioned procedures to begin to influence the way the
subjected bodies think. Likewise, disciplinary power is not repressive, it is a productive force
used for the betterment of society on a macro level. According to Foucault, disciplinary power is
takes human impulses and use them to make a more productive society, which is Foucaultian
terms is a form of domination and the exercise of hierarchal power. Foucault’s view aims to
“denature false objects and to look at practices rather than individuals” (Luxon, pg 392) for the
betterment of society, or at least to make society more productive. The central aim of
disciplinary power, in the Foucaultian view, is to compel other forces to accept the disciplinary
perspective as the norm, and the disciplinary norm as the absolute truth. Foucault’s highest aim
was to create a situation where the general populace could determine the next truth, to enter the
game of truth and experience in a more reflective and conscious manner. By making us aware of
the disciplinary apparatus, the subjected population turns their focus inward and engages in selfsurveillance, which can lead to a betterment of oneself.
Disciplinary power allows those in power to decide what is “normal” and then impose
that idea on those beneath them in the hierarchy, and in time those subjected bodies see it as
“normal” too. Individuals are shaped and created by power, as is their narrative of truth. It is a
subtle coercion at work in society that molds individuals with the intent to make politically weak

33
but economically powerful combinations of masses of individuals. The aim of the system is to
reduce individuality while at the same time alienating the subjects, and those that express
original and independent thought are transgressing. “Through processes of classification and
examination the individual is given a social and a personal identity. He or she becomes a
delinquent, a person with a person with a distinct identity. Disciplinary power thus constitutes
delinquents through concrete bodily manipulation and discursive objectification. […] We modify
our behavior in an endless attempt to approximate the normal, and in this process become certain
kinds of subjects” (Oksala, pg 89). Relations of power, as Foucault shows, are never static
things. “Through repeated exercises all individuals are moved closer to the norm, though it is
also true that the position of the norm has a tendency to climb slowly up the scale to
accommodate a shifting mean of performance” (Ransom, pg 50). Everything from managerial
policies to the actual architecture itself is used to make individuals more visible and controllable.
The idea of a system where everyone is kept in a prescribed place is actually anathema to
disciplinary power and productivity. “The very fact of being continually watched, combined with
activities that must be performed because surveillance is unceasing, allows an alteration or
bending of individuals according to a preconceived program” (Ransom, pg 50). As time goes by,
those performing repetitive tasks in the workforce will continue to grow continually more
proficient at them, allowing for an increase in productivity. Under a different system this could
lead to a more complacent workforce, doing a task faster to keep the same quotas, but because
they are under observation subjects continue to work at an increasing pace. Those who are doing
the observation are likewise watched by their superiors, meaning they must keep the productivity
steadily increasing to keep their own position. Industrial management has opened the path to a
disciplinary society where the aim of the overseers is to keep their workers as productive as
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possible. In a capitalist market economy, bodies are normalized to be productive and increase the
assets of their employer, and made to be as politically weak as bodies subjected in a political
system.
Foucault and Post Structuralism
Foucault rejected the label of structuralism and held that he was in not a structuralist, but
his writings on disciplinary power fall in line with structuralist ideals. Foucault arrived in the
psychological and philosophic fields at a time when interest in structuralism was at its height and
that led to him to be grouped together with several of his structuralist contemporaries like Jacque
Lacan and Roland Barthes. However, Foucault is perhaps more accurately called a poststructuralist, as he would challenge many notions of structuralism while still drawing from its
overarching themes. Structuralism was a sociological and anthropological system of thought that
states that human culture must be understood in the context of a relationship of power dynamics,
systems created to subject people both overtly and subtly to a hierarchal power structure. One of
the pillars of structuralism was binary oppositions, related terms that were opposite in meaning.
A binary opposition is two theoretical opposites that are strictly defined and set off against one
another (as in up and down, good and evil, civilization and savagery, etc.). Structuralists would
hold that binary oppositions were fundamental to human society, culture and language.
Oftentimes in this binary, one of the two concepts would take precedence over the other.
Foucault’s own dichotomy between knowledge and power bears shades of this. Structuralists
held that the dynamics of social attraction drives humans to enter into relations with each other
with an ultimate reward at the end of the process (Kattakayam, pg 449). In the case of
disciplinary power, this roughly translates into establishing a power structure so that others will
comply with your will, or at least provide a benefit to subjecting oneself. The post-structuralists,
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conversely, were far more likely to see subjects as merely “bodies”, components in the
machinery of power. Essentially, to the post-structuralists, modern rational society was itself a
coercive force, with individuals being dominated by institutions and practices to the point where
it has become all encompassing.
What sets Foucault apart from his structuralist contemporaries and fits him more neatly in
with the post-structuralist movement is that while the structuralists looked to the institutions of
society and how they shaped human consciousness, Foucault’s tendency was to look to human
civilization and lay out how the emergence of institutions and organizations can lead to these
apparatuses being put into place. In Discipline and Punish, while Foucault does examine the rise
of disciplinary power from the eighteenth century to the present, the focus is on “the moment
when it became understood that it was more efficient and profitable to place someone under
surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary penalty” (Sarup, pg 73). Foucault connects
this trend to the decline of monarchic power and capital punishment to a greater focus on
enclosure and, in the case of those who do not fit within society’s definition of normal,
rehabilitation. Instead of an ongoing cull and public displays of hard power, the governing bodies
began to shift the paradigm of justice towards the new models of disciplinary power. In the
feudal and monarchic societies that were widespread into the seventeenth century, only a small
portion of criminals were arrested to be tried and punished in a way spectacular enough to deter
others from attempting a similar crime. However, in the eighteenth century, theorists began to
object to these methods, noting a system of surveillance where the power was internalized made
each person into their own overseer, a far more economical and effective method of population
control. Power could, under the disciplinary model, be exercised constantly at a minimal cost to
the governing bodies, keeping the populace productive and docile while suppressing
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revolutionary or criminal sentiment by virtue of fear of retribution. The explosion of population,
especially in urban areas, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century allowed this to
become even more effective, and the old model of capital punishment would have been
ineffective when attempting to control a population that number in the tens if not hundreds of
thousands all confined to a relatively small area. The proliferation of this modality of power
allowed the governing bodies of the Western world to cope with these population booms and
tighten their grip on the track of Western civilization.
Space as Power
The use of the panopticon as a metaphor for power certainly falls in line with the
structuralist bent. Structuralists try to identify structures that underlie all the things that humans
do, think, and feel, and the apparatus of a disciplinary system would be one means of expressing
that. The panopticon itself has consistently proved to be a failure when it has been implemented
in the way that Bentham originally intended, but that is far from saying that panoptic theory has
been a failure as well. The panopticon and panoptic power structures are spaces that are
configured by power, “in which the space itself becomes the source of the power. […] Space is a
resource for power and thus it makes sense to investigate not space in general but rather systems
of space-power co-relation” (Gordana, pg 95). By analyzing concrete spaces as illustrations of
power dynamics, we are thus enabled to think and to understand the structural logic of the
construction of spaces like prisons, hospitals, schools and factories and to see how the exercise
of power is manifested through physical spaces. The analysis of power relations and the
technologies that make them possible allow the observer to view them objectively. As Johanna
Oksala says in her essay “Freedom and Bodies”, “We cannot step outside the networks of power
that circumscribe our experience, but there is always a possibility for thinking and being
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otherwise within them. To be free does not mean that everything is possible, but neither is the
present way of thinking and being a necessity” (Oksala, pg 93). To be completely free of the
power structures society has built to condition and coerce those living in it is a nearly impossible
task, made all the more difficult provided one wishes to remain a member of society as well. As
such, it is likewise impossible to view these power structures from a completely objective
viewpoint, as the observer is subjected to them. However, Foucaultian thought encourages
looking at the power structures that an observer can see objectively, for example, inmates in a
prison, and taking what can be observed there and applying it in larger form to the society one is
in.
The key difference that sets modern disciplinary panopticism apart from its original
Benthamite model is the tangibility of the methods and apparatuses that it employs. The panoptic
architecture that Bentham originally hoped to employ in his prison have been warped and
changed as the technology available has developed, taking the abject failure of the physical
panopticon and using the philosophy behind it to reshape society. “Human beings have been
released from the physical chains, but these have been replaced by mental ones. One of the main
themes of [Discipline and Punish] is how external violence has been replaced with
internalization. The birth of the asylum can be seen as an allegory on the constitution of
subjectivity and an indictment of modern consciousness.” (Sarup, pg 69) In his writing, Foucault
implies that modern forms of public provision and welfare are inseparable from ever tighter
forms of social and psychological control. From the beginning, intervention and administrative
control have defined the modern state and are worked into its foundation as the basis of
hierarchal administrative power.

38
There is a sense of inevitability to Foucaultian disciplinary power, where obedience is not
something that is ever regarded as a variable. The sheer weight of the institutions that press down
on the subjected workers, or prisoners, or patients, or soldiers, or simply citizens, is staggering.
Similarly to how Oksala mentions above, it is difficult to rebel against a power that built into the
foundation of society, through “a person’s ignorance of possible alternatives to his or her present
situation, and related to this, a sense of resignation [that is] the realization that what alternatives
there might be are practically impossible to achieve in the present situation. Obedience is also
achieved when employees have the sense that their supervisors represent their interests, or out of
fear – when, for example, it is a company norm to use lay-offs as a way of achieving obedience
or when the value system embodies an institutionalized caste system in which employees act
implicitly out of deference to the apparent superiority of their supervisors” (Hiley, pg 349). The
lack of a possible alternative is only enforced by disciplinary society’s tendency to normalize
behavior and practices that fall in line with the hierarchal power that bolsters it. With the lack of
another option, employees (or patients, or prisoners, etc.) are given the choice between
conforming to the established norm or becoming an outlier, transgressing against their society
and potentially losing everything they have worked for.
Hierarchic Institutional Power
It is impossible to deny that an unspoken caste system exists in the Western world. At the
top of the pyramid of hierarchal power, there are the few that have, then as one moves down the
pyramid there are the majority, who as they rank lower in the hierarchy are increasingly have
nots. The same is true in any conception of power, notably in the industrial world. At the top, the
few decide what tasks must be done and how those tasks ought to be done, and then they set that
task to the majority who do what they are ordered, as they are ordered to do it. Systematically,
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the top of the pyramid establishes complete control over the performance and routines of the
lower strata (Kattakayam, pg 453-4). Much like in the panoptic prison, where prisoners are
divided up both by the ordering and partitioning of space and the control of activity, the
industrial panopticon performs similar tasks. To create a disciplinary system in which tasks are
executed to the letter prescribed by the higher-ups, there is a dissociation of the labor process
from the skills of the workers. When each is given a specific task, the full knowledge of the craft
is left obscure to the workers, so that they only know how to fulfill their own role and execute it
as such. It follows then that there is a divorce between concept and execution, where the complex
features of the work, the science or engineering behind it, is always kept by the management,
effectively leaving the assembly-line task workers in the dark. This all culminates in the
power/knowledge dichotomy used to control the laborers on every step of the production.
The disciplinary apparatus balances the weight of institutional power with a system of
rewards, or what could be construed as rewards. The goal of industrial disciplinary power is, as
has been stated, to make humanity as productive and profitable as possible, with humans being
adapted as machinery for production. In exchange for being yoked to a machine (in some cases
literally), the worker is given the benefit of payment. An incentive payment system is used to
keep the workers competitive, and to regulate a worker’s movement. In modern manufacturing,
most production is done by a machine or some form of mechanical process, yet that machine
must be operated by a human worker. By instituting incentive payments and production quotas,
the worker becomes linked to the machine by necessity of providing for themselves, and in this
regulative norm, “workers automatically got stuck in front of the machine, bound hand and foot
to its rhythm” (Kattakayam, pg 455). The idea was that by making the worker dependent on the
machine for continued subsistence, they would be more willing to produce more, and at an even
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deeper level lies in the idea and basic assumption that humans below the empowered in the
hierarchy are by default docile and exist solely to be manipulated, subjected and used.
The Eye of the Digital Panopticon
These forms of power are not limited to manufacturing, and the advent of the digital
society has changed the very nature of gaze and the proliferation of the panoptic apparatus. Now,
with computerized systems and near constant data-gathering, a company’s management can see
precisely at what rate their employees are working, even if the nature of the job is more clerical
than productive. Everything can be monitored, from the number of keystrokes one must use to
complete a form, to how quickly the form can be completed, to how many minutes each day the
worker spends away from their terminal. All of this data is gathered and averaged in a larger
server and reported back to the arbiters. “Scientific management in the computer age runs the
risk of creating “electronic sweatshops” in which the demands of efficiency and control are
achieved at the expense of an employee’s right to privacy or freedom from intimidation” (Hiley,
pg 352). This leads to ethical gray areas, but is a cornerstone of the modern panopticon. Society
has prioritized the pursuit of profit and efficiency to the point that the well-being of employees
has long since fallen by the wayside (and in fact has not been a concern since the dawn of the
industrial revolution and the first vestiges of the separation of workers and owners), and modern
society has made itself rich and powerful at the expense of personal freedom and liberty. Those
that agitate against the system are quickly drummed out for one reason or another and summarily
replaced with a worker less likely to cause a fuss. Especially in a society where there are more
workers than opportunities, there is always someone to replace a troublesome cog that will not
mesh properly and keep the mechanism running smoothly. However, this is not a history of the
working class or the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism. Suffice to say, the wishes of the few have
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largely come to outweigh the needs of the many, and those few have for generations used their
power over the disciplinary systems that form society at its most basic level to increasingly
subject workers to become a quiet, docile and productive force.
Conclusion
The Foucaultian conception of power is nothing new, and the power/knowledge dynamic
has existed for as long as humanity has exercised power over their inferiors. In Thucydides’
Melian Dialogue, the people of Athens demand the island of Melos’s unconditional surrender in
the face of overwhelming odds, with the only alternative being their conquest and slaughter. The
people of Melos refuse, and are subsequently conquered by the Athenians. While this can be
seen as an early example of the failure of political realism, it can also be viewed as one of the
early example of political bio-power manifesting itself, essentially, the strong will do what they
will, the weak will do what they must to survive. Power is an essential feature to human social
relationships, and power has always been a calculated and deliberately thought out mechanism,
imbued via a hierarchy to give it a veneer of legitimacy and normalcy. What makes the modern
disciplinary model of power so interesting is that it has remained largely unchanged throughout
the past two hundred or so years, with the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism. The pillars that
uphold the modern economic and political systems borrow heavily from the Foucaultian
conception of power, whether the system and those given power by the system are aware of it or
not. However, what makes this form of power so interesting in the modern age is the changing
nature of technology, and its constant evolution over the past several decades that has allowed
the empowered to have unprecedented access to the wider population to observe them and the
trends of their behavior. This observation has become so normalized that most people within the
system see nothing wrong with the fact that a government can access the private lives and
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information of its citizens until we are shown exactly to what extent that that access entails. And
even then, after a short burst of outrage that a vague yet menacing government agency can access
every bit of information about them, the population quickly returns to docility, knowing that they
can do very little to change the system. Is it dystopic, Orwellian, and only flimsily justified
ethically? Certainly. But it is also completely legal under the current system and ostensibly done
for the protection of citizens.
The aim of disciplinary power in its simplest form is control. By controlling access to
information, those at the highest places of the hierarchy control the narrative of the subjected and
are able to create their own form of truth. Normalcy can be established, and those that go against
the established norms of a system are dealt with, either by removal or by reconditioning. The use
of panoptic power in the disciplinary models means that employers and inspectors can constantly
be watching and observing subjects to ensure that they perform the way they are supposed to. In
the purely capitalist model, workers are cogs and stripped of individuality, turned towards their
employers goals with little thought for them as a person. If a worker cannot keep up to task, then
they are labeled as defective and dealt with accordingly. Administrative control defines the new
social panopticon, and those in power capitalize on the methods of power that the panopticon
enables. Since labor in manufacturing sectors has become more procedural at the beginning of
the industrial age, disciplinary power has provided an effective and proven method for
controlling workforces and as a tool for repression.
Panoptic power is entirely founded on the power/knowledge dichotomy, and the modern
information panopticon labors under the pretense that it is in place to protect the people within
the system, though protecting them from what is left deliberately vague. On the one hand, the
panopticon could protect its citizens from threats from within that would seek to destabilize the
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system, it also “protects” them from knowledge that would allow them to see the system more
objectively and the checks that the panopticon systematically places upon them. This makes the
modern panopticon a self-perpetuating vicious cycle that holds its denizens in a culture of fear,
withholding knowledge for reasons never made especially clear, only to benefit the upper
echelons of society.
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Chapter 3: Mass Surveillance and the Panoptic Gaze
The crux of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and the impetus behind its design was to
create a structure that enabled a singular watcher to have an unobstructed view of everything that
existed within view of the watchtower, effectively becoming the eye of God. In modernity,
advances in technology have made large-scale observation possible on scales that vastly exceed
anything Bentham could have predicted. The rise of the modern security state allows
governments and powerful corporations to observe behaviors and trends in citizens and
consumers to more easily control them and to enforce checks on transgressive behavior. There
are very few public places that do not some form of security camera or CCTV, and any time one
connects to the Internet, their traffic is monitored by various markers for reasons of commerce
and security. The practice of panopticism has now spread beyond institutions, be those the
traditional Benthamite prisons and workhouses or in the wider, more Foucaultian sense, any
institution that exercises disciplinary power and conditioning, and outward to first the authorities
that control the aforementioned institutions and then still further to the states that control even
those authorities.
The panoptic state goes far beyond what Bentham originally intended for the panopticon,
even considering his grand design of a panoptic village of prisoners. Even in Bentham’s loftiest
imagining, the panopticon was a deceptively simple apparatus. Provided a guard could watch the
subjected bodies, the system was supposed to work, and all it required was a suitable vantage
point. Foucaultian panopticism refined this, but even so, he held fast with the idea of le regard,
the panoptic gaze. The panoptic state cannot function like the traditional panopticon. “The
volume of information secured by the vast apparatus of state surveillance of the society is far too
high for any individual to process and act on. […] The collective Inspector is in effect broken
down into a functional division of labor to play essentially the same surveillance role with
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essentially the same objective: internalization of the rules by the subject and compliance without
overt coercion whenever possible” (Whittaker, pg 44). In truth, this does not sound terribly far
removed from the Foucaultian panopticon, but there is something drastically different from the
panoptic gaze that manifests itself as the guard standing on the street corner listening for sounds
of disruption or the knowledge of a corporate higher up with the ability to access your work and
work history to determine productivity and the panoptic gaze that is able to see you from every
angle, from every street corner, that tracks your behavior in the workplace, in the classroom and
even in the supposed privacy of home. Under the modern form of panoptic power, people are
told not to fear surveillance, that it is all being done in the interest of greater public good.
Though the presence of security cameras has become ubiquitous in urban centers and everyone is
at least vaguely aware that our online presences can be monitored at any time, people are
encouraged to pay it little mind because if they do nothing wrong then they have no need to fear
reprisal. Whereas under classical panopticism subjects are encouraged to take stock of
themselves and attempt to portray their best possible selves to the Inspector, under the modern
panoptic model subjects are induced to act as naturally as possible and to not modify their
behavior for the Inspector’s sake. That self-awareness of the watching eye is taken away and
obscured so that those subjected to the panoptic eye are less likely to respond to it.
Panoptic Technologies
The advent of information technology changed the surveillance landscape, but even
before the general population had access to the Internet and the Pandora’s Box it represents,
there had been a gradual move towards more refined camera and facial recognition technology
for decades. Now with the overlapping of gazes and the ability to identify anyone provided the
inspector has access to the appropriate databases, the idea of privacy and personal information is
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steadily becoming more and more fictitious. The proliferation of databases that record faces and
patterns means that there is significant overlap among them, and this allows for the gradual
leakage of data from the public sector into the private, and vice versa. Companies can track their
employees’ backgrounds by way of using resources available to police forces, while at the same
time, said information is then used to bolster the information of those police forces.
Obviously, these applications are not inherently bad things. All of these security
measures were created with ostensibly altruistic intentions in mind. The video analysis systems
now available to law enforcement and governments can pick out a singular face in a crowd and
flag it for attention; for example an escaped criminal, known terrorist or simply a missing person.
But on the other hand, the darker applications of these systems quickly manifest when the device
is directed at “refugees, political dissidents or striking trade unionists. Such technologies are
moving into the hands of private corporate security, which stands outside whatever regulation
and democratic accountability may constrain state agencies. New technologies invariably make
their way into the general marketplace. Recent years have seen a proliferation of shops selling
personal snooping devices, no questions asked, at dramatically falling prices” (Whittaker, pg 86).
In the past several years, civilian drone aircraft communities have set up, allowing average
citizens to fairly easily obtain an aircraft tailor-made to capture video for purposes benign and
not.
The difficulty when dealing with the evolving technologies that enable panoptic power is
that on their own they are not necessarily considered a bad thing, and in fact could be quite easily
construed as positive social benefits. The argument can be made that the potential risks posed by
contemporary surveillance are acceptable and counterbalanced by the increased sense of security
they provide. In contemporary society the issue arises when one considers whether human
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dignity and personal liberty are a fitting price to pay for personal security. However, this neglects
the Foucaultian lens, in which freedom is seen only as an underlying condition for power, and in
the absence of freedom the only method through which power could be exercised is outright
domination (Crane, pg 304). In the disciplinary model, subjects must be allowed to be free, at
least enough to be presented with choices for their behavior. If they have been conditioned
properly, they will engage in self-surveillance and act in accordance with the norms of the social
framework they find themselves in. As far as Foucault would be concerned, personal liberty was
nothing more than a pleasant fiction created by the disciplinary apparatus to exercise more
efficient control. The aim of disciplinary power contests the view of seizing power for its own
sake, and in doing so minimizes the effects that an overtly dominating form of power would
exhibit.
However, the contemporary prevailing view of politics does not see things this way, and
the conception of power enumerated above presents a paradox, as humanity is seen to be moving
towards a more enlightened age that is aided by advances in technology, but when that same
technology can be used for repressive purposes, society ultimately takes several steps backward.
“The impact of information technology in human affairs is sometimes taken to be one indicator
that we are entering a qualitatively different phase of social development from that known as
‘modernity’. Among other things, in the condition of postmodernity it is sometimes said that we
can no longer be as sure as we were of the status of human personhood — apart from being
historically relatives. At the same time, the growth of electronic surveillance has thrown up
questions about privacy that ultimately can only be addressed in terms of some conception of
personhood and human identity” (Lyon, pg 18). Essentially, there is a conflict between the
postmodern conception of humanity and personhood and the cost/benefit calculus of a globalized

48
surveillance system implemented in the interest of greater security. The technology that enables
it is both part of the problem and partly the remedy. “People trust themselves to complex
technologies because they seem to promise convenience, efficiency, security and reduced
uncertainty. Simultaneously, we worry that in doing so we may be denying something important
to a worthwhile life” (Lyon, pg 20) though what that ‘something’ is can be difficult to define.
Rise of the Electronic Panopticon
The Benthamite panopticon and the modern (or postmodern) panopticon differ greatly,
with the biggest discrepancy being a fundamental one. In the original panopticon, the basis of
institutional power was vested in the watchtower in the center of the prison complex, or in the
wider sense, exercised by a very visible authoritative presence. The modern surveillance
panopticon has dispensed with the visible watchtower, and in fact most forms of hard power
entirely. The modern panopticon exists via a series of lenses and microphones connected by
intangible webs. Much like in the traditional panopticon, those subjected cannot know whether
or not they are being watched, but in the modern panopticon, the subjects are not even aware
they are being observed. Social conditioning and the normalizing of the presence of surveillance
devices has conditioned the wider population to ignore the lenses. The cameras are designed to
be unobtrusive so that the gaze of the subjects passes over them, allowing for various
overlapping lines of sight for whomever happens to be in the control booth. Many large cities,
for example, New York, London, Baltimore, etc. have adopted security cameras at nearly every
street corner, with London claiming the dubious honor of being the most surveyed city in the
world. Following the lead of these large population center, smaller townships have likewise
begun adopting measures like their exponentially larger counterparts. Towns that have a
population of only a few thousand have begun placing security cameras around their town
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centers despite generally modest crime rates. “The United Kingdom has taken urban video
surveillance for policing purposes perhaps further than any other Western country. It has become
relatively common in British town centers to have comprehensive street surveillance in place.
There seems to be a cumulative dynamic at work: towns “without protection” fear that they will
become targets of criminals if they do not follow suit, and there is some evidence to this effect.
This has led to towns with as few as 1,500 inhabitants to have their own system” (Whitaker, pg
83). The impetus behind the spread of the modern panopticon has been to play of the public’s
fears and anxieties about crime to introduce measures that are ostensibly and primarily to
promote public good and security. But the potential for these devices to be turned to less noble
ends remains, and the simple fact that these devices are constantly recording video footage to
track the comings and goings of citizens implies that there is at least the possibility that someone
on the other end is watching.
The two key differences between the panopticon of Bentham and Foucault and the
electronic information panopticon one is that the modern one is primarily decentered and that it
is largely a participatory structure where the subjected bodies are consenting participants. As
stated previously, many see the panopticon as an acceptable measure because there are clear
benefits to sacrificing their right to privacy in the interest of greater personal security, and the
disadvantages are generally far less tangible. “Intrusive surveillance by an oppressive
government (‘Big Brother is watching you!’) rouses deep resentment, but what if the slogan
appears rather as ‘Big Brother is watching out for you’?” (Whittaker, pg 141) The system
spreads intrusively and in the guise of convenience. Many see no problem in having their
purchase history tracked by credit card companies or banks, especially when that information can
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be used to track suspicious spending patterns that may indicate identity theft. But that data is
stored somewhere, and someone has complete access to it.
The old panopticon required isolation and fragmentation to separate its captives from
each other to curtail communication among the bodies contained within, a state of being that
made the prisoners’ (or students, patients, etc.) only individualized relationship the one they
shared with the Inspector. Much like what happens to Winston in Orwell’s 1984, the panopticon
seeks to isolate the subjects by trimming away their relationships to others, leaving only a topdown command structure from the authority, with that relationship being the one form of human
interaction valued above others. But in the modern panopticon, that sense of hard power is
largely done away with. Now when the panoptic gaze is turned on a subject, it is to understand
their needs and to serve their desires, only to catalogue those desires to later play back against
them.
Rise of the Smart Machine
In Shoshana Zuboff’s “In the Age of the Smart Machine”, she examines the various ways
in which disciplinary power has entered the workplace. The examples she repeatedly cites are
manufacturing plants that implement a system that allows them to track the progress of their
employees, where every keystroke and action must be logged. This allows for comprehensive
tracking of the procedures of a plant, even afterhours when only one or two workers are onsite
and none of the plant managers are present. They are able to access the data remotely, and that
data is stored in an electronic archive. The overview system allows the managers to track their
employees’ behavior and problem solving skills to build an objective picture of the goings-on of
the plant. One of the managers she interviewed said “This computer is like X-ray vision. It
makes the people who operate the process very unfriendly. It’s like lifting up the rock and the
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roaches scurry out. If the employee blows it, it’s clear right away. You can know who didn’t do
what. If a person stops concentrating, you know it from the data” (Zuboff, pg 316). In this
instance, the overview system functions more like a traditional panopticon, as its presence is very
overt and the employees are very aware that they are being monitored and can become as
resentful of it as if they were in the traditional panopticon. However, like the postmodern
panopticon, the system is decentered and does not need to take advantage of physical
architecture, nor does it require the mutual presence of the objects of observation. The
information is logged and can be accessed at the Inspector’s leisure, and the information is
continually captured, regardless of the intention of the Inspector (Zuboff, pg 322). The overview
systems that Zuboff profiles are used to check the employees of the plants, and the power of the
system hangs over their heads like Damocles’ sword. While the overview system can be used for
guidance and counselling and to vet employees for promotions, Zuboff’s research showed that
far more often it was used to take disciplinary action as it would be able to give absolute proof of
poor performance. Because the system is so omnipotent, it can be easy for the subjected workers
to grow to resent it, as its presence is so keenly felt.
This makes the “smart machine” that Zuboff deals with something of a subversion of the
modern panopticon as it has come to be regarded, in that the modern panopticon exists explicitly
in a way that its influence is intended to be invisible and unnoticeable. However, Zuboff’s
machine generally makes its presence felt, or at least the mechanics through which it exercises its
power are known to the plant workers that it observes. However, much of this has to do with the
time that her examination of power was done in, as her text was published in 1988. The
technology available for surveillance has long since outpaced what the overview system was
capable of and introduced more ways to monitor employees and subjects. However, Zuboff’s
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text is still regarded as one of the foremost authoritative texts on panopticism in the workplace
and in the modern era, addressing the ways in which a society that has become increasingly more
dependent on information technology has evolved to make such ubiquitous observation possible.
The idea of monitoring employees is nothing new, and can be traced back to the earliest
days of mechanized society. Henry Ford, regarded as the first modern industrialist and the
driving force behind the introduction of assembly-line productivity, used his system to control
the output of his workers, with those who could not keep up with the pace the assembly line set
being culled from the workforce. However, Ford’s attempt to control his employees extended
beyond the workplace with the institution of what he called the Sociology Department. Ford
expected his workers’ private lives to fall in line with his managerial standards of morality, and
so would dispatch company spies to keep employees under observation on their off hours, and
any behavior found objectionable could be grounds for termination (Whittaker, pg 38). The
worker was no longer able to leave the trappings of capitalism behind at the factory gates,
because the same standards that he was expected to follow at the factory now followed him
home. As the surveillance technology has evolved, this has only become more prevalent, and
employers no longer need to employ a corps of spies when they can instead monitor their
employees’ web presence and social media trafficking.
What links Foucaultian thought to these monitoring systems is the effect they have on the
people they survey. In Zuboff’s manufacturing plant examples, the workers knew that their jobs
would be on the line if something went wrong and the system logged it. They are far more likely
to take more care in their work to ensure complications do not arise, and if they do, to make sure
that they cannot be held liable. This applies on a wider social level as well, especially as
surveillance technology becomes more widespread and the public more aware of it. With this
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awareness of external entities observing actions, the public is more likely to look inward and
engage in self-surveillance, monitoring both what they do and say to be more in line with social
norms and not draw the attention of the system. If they do nothing to call attention to themselves,
they will be just another common data point in a large matrix.
Foucault’s conception of self-governance holds that people reflect in on their interpretive
framework to form a more coherent picture of the world around them, and an integral part of this
is how they relate to the power structures they find themselves in. Foucault never denounced the
act of surveillance nor did he condemn the process of self-surveillance. What he stood against
was “those who would retract their political comments from a psychology of fear […] because
these collective practices constitute the resources individuals have to work with as they develop
themselves ethically and act politically” (Luxon, pg 392). In the Foucaultian sense, selfgoverning and self-surveillance were tools used in repression and social control, but like any
tool, they could be turned to more productive means. In a system that follows the modern
panoptic model, subjects are encouraged to put checks on their own behavior to better fall in line
with the norm, but at the same time, this increase of self-awareness can inadvertently allow the
subjects to become a more proactive force in their own conception of freedom.
The Patriot Act and Surveillance in a Post-September 11th World
What makes electronic mass surveillance a difficult subject, especially in the political
realm, is that the technology associated with it evolves at a rapid rate that can make it nearly
impossible for proper regulation to keep pace. With the lack of policies and judicial doctrine on
these surveillance technologies, unethical behavior becomes permissible simply because there
has not been time to create appropriate legislation to check it. However, the age of modern
surveillance and the existence of the present surveillance society is interesting in that we can
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trace the policies that allowed all of this to be possible to the very moment of their inception,
September 11th 2001. When terrorist attacks against American citizen became a real and present
danger, the government quickly instituted policies to combat it, the most notable being the
PATRIOT act. This authorized the use of roving wiretaps, searches of business records and the
surveillance and collection of personal records on “lone wolves”, people suspected of being
involved in terrorist activity. While national security is indeed a concern in the post-9/11 world,
many of the justifications used for search and seizure under the PATRIOT act were established
by capitalizing on the culture of fear that permeated American society in the immediate wake of
September 11th. “Before the dust had settled on Manhattan, the security establishment had
mobilized to expand and intensify their surveillance capabilities, justifying existing proposals as
necessary tools to fight the new war against terrorism. Ultimately, the police, military and
security establishment reaped an unanticipated windfall of increased funding, new technology
and loosened legislative constraints by strategically invoking fears of future attacks” (Haggerty,
pg 179). Many of the expansions of power laid out by the PATRIOT act already existed as
proposed legislation that had been shot down in previous incarnations, either being seen as
unconstitutional or giving too much power to certain branches of government. But in the
uncertainty that characterized the period immediately following the terrorist attacks, lawmakers
who supported those measures saw an opportunity and took it, establishing the precedent for
what effectively became a new political age.
In the PATRIOT act itself, two sections explicitly deal with panopticism and mass
surveillance by the government, Title V and Title IX. Title V’s purpose was to remove
obstructions that would otherwise impede the investigation of terrorism. This includes phone
records and email transcripts that can be seized by any agent with little justification given and

55
without the need of a warrant. “The investigator needs only to state that the information is
relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities” (Michaels, pg 137). This part of the act gives investigators complete
access to what is regarded as some of the most private, personal and sensitive information of
American citizens (telephone records, financial records, consumer reports, hospital and
educational records, etc.) and only requires “a simple certification by federal investigation
officials to be provided with private information without a court order or a showing of probable
cause” (Michaels, pg 139), thereby sidestepping judicial oversight entirely. However, what
makes this most chilling is the fact that while there are provisions in the PATRIOT act for
certain clauses and sections to become inactive, Title V has no such provision, and as such can
be assumed to be a permanent measure. Title IX grants yet greater powers of surveillance to the
government, and like Title V, the provisions that it sets out are permanent. However, unlike Title
V, the changes implemented by Title IX are not ambiguous in their permanence and supported
by vague language, but instead are explicitly stated to have no sunset date. The early sections of
Title IX establish in no uncertain terms that international terrorist activities fall under the
purview of the PATRIOT act and can be investigated by the federal government, and expands
the search and seizure warrants that can be sought by government investigators. Section 903,
however, has incredible potential for abuse. It “encourages federal intelligence agency officers
and employees to ‘make every effort’ to ‘establish and maintain intelligence relationships with
any person, entity or group for the purpose of engaging in lawful intelligence activities.’ This
includes obtaining information on ‘location, identity, finance, affiliations, capabilities, plans or
intentions’ of a ‘terrorist or terrorist organization.’ This effort also includes information on ‘any
other person, entity, or group (including a foreign government) engaged in harboring, financing,
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aiding or assisting a terrorist group’” (Michaels, pg 159). The language employed in this section
is grandiose and vague enough to seem almost innocuous. However, it merely couches the
language that says that a member of any government intelligence agency, such as the CIA, NSA
or FBI at presumably any level of employment can consider independently that any given
individual might be a terrorist and conduct their own investigation of them at will, and using the
new methods of search and surveillance opened up to them under the PATRIOT act, this
becomes even easier to abuse.
With the tools of surveillance rapidly growing more refined and widespread, the agencies
and institutions that use them are adapting quickly and incorporating them into their repertoire as
soon as they become viable. However, the rapid pace at which these technologies evolve makes
it difficult to have any kind of oversight for them, and as such there is very little judicial doctrine
that applies to surveillance technologies. For example, the Fourth Amendment states that
individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their “papers and effects” once
they have been given over to third parties. Under the modern technologic panopticon, most
telecommunications are stored on a company’s servers, essentially making them held in the
custody of a third party. “The government has relied on outdated precedent to argue that it need
not acquire a warrant based upon probable cause to read the contents of an individual’s emails
stored online because those emails are in the physical possession (i.e. on the servers) of the email
service provider” (Shamshi, pg 9). The government has also advocated, with the endorsement of
the courts, that if anyone is to challenge the surveillance programs they have instituted, the
challenger must prove that their communications have indeed been intercepted. This is not
helped by the government’s tightlipped nature when it comes to their subjects of surveillance, as
they have consistently refused to identify any of their subjects, ostensibly in the interest of
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national security. The courts have so far been in line with the government on these policies, but
even should they oppose them, there is little legal or constitutional basis for them to intervene.
Surveillance and Conflict
In Christopher Capozzola’s essay “Afterburn: Knowledge and Wartime”, he notes that
oftentimes surveillance is expanded upon in times of war and global conflict as a dangerous but
necessary measure done to protect citizens, and that when the conflict of threat has passed the
laws that enabled it in the first place are sometimes rolled back or repealed. But far more likely
to happen is that the more overt mechanisms of control and surveillance are removed from use
while the legislation and authorization that allowed them to go into effect in the first place is
made to go dormant, ready to be reapplied in broad strokes should the need ever rise again. This
is largely due to the fact that once the conflict that necessitated the stricter security measures has
passed, the public will be far less interested in matters of security, and power structures are able
to get away with keeping tighter measures in place because people are no longer inclined to look
into them. He cites that occasionally, the power granted to the state to collect knowledge from
and about citizens comes from a reinterpretation of old laws and policies that were written long
before certain technologies were developed, and those policies are twisted to enable and
legitimize the use of new understandings of power. For example, “in early 1917, Justice
Department staff attorney Charles Warren dusted off the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, a relic of
exceptionality that had been all but forgotten in the century since the Alien and Sedition Acts.
Soon, however, President Woodrow Wilson applied its florid provisions to every German citizen
age 14 or over who resided in the United States, requiring not only that they register with the
federal government, but—in a modernization that John Adams could not have predicted—that
they provide the government with photographs and fingerprints as well” (Capozzola, pg 816).
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The powers that be are able to get away with these provisions because they are capitalizing on a
widespread fear of the Other, especially the dangers that the Other presents. In the modern times,
nearly a hundred years later, the same culture of fear means the empowered can use similar
methods to exert control over society. However, this methodology can backfire, for once citizens
learn about the measures the government has taken to keep tabs not just on threats overseas but
also on citizens with their own borders, the backlash is immediate and severe. The American
government has consistently acted to limit citizen access to knowledge about the state itself and
also the inner workings of the state (Capozzola, pg 822), to varying degrees of success.
In recent years, the public has been made more aware of the government’s actions
especially throughout the last wars in the Middle East as threats have gone from geopolitical
entities to disparate groups with little cohesion. With the threat of danger lurking so close at
hand, many private citizens feel it is an acceptable risk to allow the government access to their
data in times of national panic, but our collective attentiveness to what is being monitored and
when tends to wane as the threat becomes less immediate. But recent events have made the
public at large far more conscious of what government agencies and corporations can see, and
have taken measures to censor their presence in the datasphere. However, this greater awareness
of the lenses through which we are viewed also means that the watchers themselves must find
new ways to engage and survey the public they ostensibly protect. The modern surveillance
apparatus functions quite similarly to the Foucaultian panopticon where the Inspector behind the
glass is inscrutable to the inspected, and oftentimes the relationship is likewise one where the
Inspector may not actually be present in his tower or if so, even turning his gaze on a specific
subject. However, the benefit of modern technologies occasionally allows for the subverting of
the hierarchy, and the watched can turn the gaze back on the watchers. When the public is again
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made aware of the extent of mass surveillance, the institutions that carry out aforementioned
surveillance must learn to tread more carefully until the public’s ire fades, and oftentimes the
loopholes that were exploited to allow the breadth of surveillance they enjoyed in the first place
are closed by new legislation to protect the public’s interests.
The Surveillant Assemblage
The claims made by the agencies gathering data is that their purpose is to keep us safe.
This is essentially true. However, the sheer volume of data being collected allows for anyone
with access to the proper channels to build a detailed picture of the subject. “Considerable
surveillance is undertaken by the bureaucratic structures that most of us encounter in our daily
lives as we acquire a driver’s license, withdraw funds from a financial institution, or attend
school. Each of these unremarkable acts produces a record which forms part of our data double”
(Haggerty, pg 172), a series of electronic traces that can be compiled into a cohesive image of a
subject. This is part of a larger concept of a “surveillant assemblage”, a means to make sense of
the reams of data that are produced daily by corporations, police forces, private citizens and
governments. This surveillant assemblage is a byproduct of the decentered modern panopticon,
the sum total of a far-reaching apparatus that can be trained on a location, population or even a
single subject. “It is less a ‘thing’ than it is a potentiality that can be actualized to varying
degrees depending on what and how observational regimes are combined and aligned”
(Haggerty, pg 174). The component parts of the assemblage can be centralized, but unlike the
Benthamite panopticon it does not need to be to function to its fullest potential. Haggerty and
Gazso argue that the modern surveillance apparatus undergoes a process of simultaneous
decentralization and centralization. While the systems of surveillance continue to proliferate out
amongst various organizations, they can be centralized quickly and efficiently when agencies
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work together and pool their resources. “Hence, while the totality of surveillance in society
amounts to a fractured and disconnected set of sub-systems, these can occasionally be integrated
on a temporary or permanent to produce a remarkably detailed picture of individuals or
locations” (Haggerty, pg 174). These dissociated security systems form the basis of the
decentered panopticon, and the basis of the modern security apparatus.
The largest limitation of the modern panopticon is that it produces more information and
data than it can use. With all of the information that comes through the system, no single entity
can process and make sense of it, even if it is spread throughout multiple institutions. Zuboff’s
text deals with comparatively early incarnations of electronic panopticism, and even then, the
plant systems were taking status updates and logging the precise movements of the equipment in
intervals that ranged anywhere from three seconds to one half-second. While surveillance does
tend to identify specific targets and work up from there, the data is recorded and stored in
sprawling systems to be accessed at a later date, even if much of it is never used at all.
Surveillance is only likely to expand as technology and infrastructure march onward. As more
and more of society comes under observation in the interest of public “safety”, the presence of
the security apparatus will prompt less transparent communities to adopt measures like CCTV
cameras in the interest of “safety”, meaning that security and surveillance are dynamic and
escalating entities, motivated chiefly by the fear of being less visible in places and more likely,
apparently, to be the victim of criminal or terrorist activity. We are fully aware that Big Brother
is watching, we just want to ensure that he is watching even more closely.
Panopticism and the Public Eye
One of the important reasons that the mass surveillance apparatus is spreading so rapidly
and unchecked is that the general population lacks the imagination to see the real risk of the tools
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and apparatuses of the security panopticon. Once the devices to keep tabs on populations have
been installed, it is likely that they will never be removed except to update them with newer and
more refined technologies. Any group that comes to power in the foreseeable future will have
access to surveillance cameras, electronic databases, roving wiretaps, Internet monitoring and
longstanding legal precedent to take advantage of all of those things. A terrifying inheritance, to
be sure, and one that is chilling even in the hands of a democratic government that has checks
placed on the degree to which such things can be exploited, however flimsy those checks might
seem. In the hands of a totalitarian state (or even the hands of someone of dubious morals and a
slightly skewed sense of ethics), Orwell’s vision of 1984 would be just the tip of a very large and
intimidating iceberg.
The problem is that “when asked to contemplate the future, Westerners tend to envision a
world that looks remarkably like the present. Rarely do citizens acknowledge the prospect of
drastic political and social transformation, making it difficult for them to appreciate the
dystopian potentials inherent in certain technologies” (Haggerty, pg 184). But this view is
decidedly myopic, for if the past several decades have shown Western society anything, it is how
quickly technologies can evolve. Even since the turn of the millennium, when dial-up internet
was still the norm, we have seen the continued refinement of camera lenses and an increasing
sophistication of listening devices. Political structures are volatile and subject to modifications,
with regimes rising and falling from power not infrequently. Vast reservoirs of personal data are
now at the fingertips of any group new to power (or even with just the proper security clearance).
But it is difficult to imagine this, and far more comforting to assume that “If I have nothing to
hide, I have nothing to fear”, a mindset deliberately cultivated by the very real institutions that
wish to gather this data in the first place. In time, this lack of imagination on the possible, and
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even probable, logical extreme of mass surveillance and the modern panopticon could prove
disastrous. The largest issue with panoptic power today is that legislation that could combat its
invasive tendencies and better preserve citizens’ liberties is intentionally stalled because the
technologies that make up the panoptic apparatus are in a constant state of evolution. A law that
would limit a certain form of panoptic surveillance could be obsolete in five years as the
technology that replaces it manages to exploit new loopholes. The mindset of thinking that
everything will stay the same means that the general public is largely taken unaware when a new
technology enters the game and is able to exploit them in ways previously not thought possible,
and little can be done to prevent it because the abuses of power have never been conceived of.
Conclusion
The modern security systems are in place and were put in place primarily to protect
citizens. It is impossible to deny that the technologies have been continually refined over the past
several decades to make society more transparent and people easier to keep track of. But it is also
true that over the course of the past several decades, the political landscape and the nature of
threats to Western nations have changed from large national threats that engaged in geopolitical
wars with set conflict lines to groups that are able to blend into populations, and whose only
defining factor is a shared ideology. A society where potentially anyone can be a threat is one
that needs constant policing to ensure that those threats can be deal with, hopefully before they
start to pile up a body count. Surveillance systems have historically emerged and expanded
alongside democratic government and the expansion of citizenship rights. The social contract
applies to modern surveillance society as much as it ever did, and even the rapidly improving
pace of technological breakthroughs is not enough to change that. The world is now overlaid
with networks in constant communication with each other. This allows for the rapid transfer of

63
data throughout various institutions, and has led to a more connected world and a more easily
traced population. On its own, this is not a bad thing. But as with all things, there is the potential
to use it for good or ill, and presently, the powers that be, whether they are vague yet menacing
government agencies, international mega-corporations, or just someone with the ability to track
credit card purchases can use that information to assemble a frighteningly accurate representation
of anyone they care to track down. By analyzing the modern panopticon through a Foucaultian
lens, it becomes clear that the system as it stands was implemented because it was said to protect
citizens from external threats and things that could jeopardize their safety. However, now that the
security apparatus has spread so far, it has the potential to be turned against citizens and be used
as a tool of repression and fear. Under the modern panoptic form of power, citizens are required
to give up their liberty in the interest of safety, and a culture of fear is encouraged. When the
system is working at its best, the subjects living under the regime are encouraged to forget that
they are under surveillance so that the watchers can gather data uninterrupted. But when the full
extent of the surveillance is made more public, the watchers then encourage a culture where one
is expected to constantly monitor their own behavior, much like they would in a panoptic prison.
If there is nothing to hide, then there is nothing to fear, and so it is in the best interests of the
citizens to have nothing to hide. This behavioral editing is for Foucault the very core of
disciplinary power and one of the most effective tools for controlling populations. Viewed from
a Foucaultian lens, one can see that modern society, even in so-called free nations live under a
regime of fear and double-think that is supported by the mass electronic surveillance that has
been implemented. The people have been convinced that they need to be watched to be safe, and
so they sign away their freedom to protect themselves without fully understanding the impact of
their actions. The community then punishes itself for any transgression. This allows the people
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higher in the power hierarchy to control society without actually exerting any overt power over
it, only using the anxieties of the public to further shore themselves up. While this is in our best
interests, society is quickly approaching a crossroads where we must decide if we are willing to
trade our right to privacy for an increased sense of security. Big Brother is watching out for you,
but that does not change the fact that Big Brother is still watching.
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Chapter 4: The Snowden Effect
On June 5 of 2013, the Guardian released an exclusive report revealing a secret court
th

order from the United States government forcing Verizon to give them the phone records of
millions of the Americans. They quickly follow it up with another exclusive story revealing to
the public the existence of the Prism program that gave NSA agents access to information on
citizens held by Internet and data corporations like Google, Apple and Facebook. The
corporations deny that they gave the United States government back door access to this
information, and President Obama is quick to defend the program, saying that it is impossible to
have complete security and simultaneously complete freedom and privacy. A third exclusive on
June 8th reveals the existence of Boundless Informant, a tool used by the NSA to analyze data
and track where it comes from. The story also questions the claims that the NSA has made to
Congress saying that the sheer volume of data it collects means that it cannot keep track of all the
surveillance it carries out on American communications. The next day, the whistleblower
responsible for the leaks goes public, declaring that he had no reason to hide because he honestly
believed that he had done nothing wrong. And so, in the span of just a few days, Edward
Snowden became a household name.
Edward Snowden was a former Central Intelligence Agency employee and former
contractor of the United States government. In 2013, he was serving a contract through the NSA
at Booz Allen Hamilton, a defense contractor based in Hawaii. In late May of that year, he
copied thousands of sensitive documents and revealed them to the public. He then fled to Hong
Kong where he established contact with Glenn Greenwald of the Guardian and Laura Poitras, a
documentary filmmaker. In the wake of the exclusives and reveals that come through Greenwald
and the Guardian, the intelligence community was thrown into tumult. His tacit admission of
what he had done completely destabilized the modern panopticon that had long since evolved
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beyond the hard power of the watchtower that marked the pre-electronic age. Though Bentham
and to an extent Foucault based their panoptic models on the overt presence of an Inspector, the
continuing march of technology had long since rendered the need for such a notable display
obsolete. The new panopticon enforces its power by keeping its subjects under observation, but it
does so in subtle ways, often without the knowledge of the subjects within it. Snowden pulled
back the curtain on the panopticon, effectively doing what had rendered the earlier attempts at a
physical panoptic prison failures.
Snowden’s acts changed the way the world viewed the panoptic architecture, simply
because he brought it back into view. Under the Benthamite model of the panopticon, the
watchtower was a very tangible thing, and its gaze was consistently felt. However, in the modern
age, the tangibility of the panopticon was lessened and the focus was on diverting attention from
the surveillance apparatus to the point where those subjected to it could forget that they were
under observation at all. By destroying that illusion, Edward Snowden reminded people that yes,
there were provisions in place that certain powerful people had access to any sort of personal
data they wanted about anyone in the country, to be accessed as they wished. His blowing the
whistle returned the panoptic landscape to that of self-surveillance and an awareness of the
Inspector that had previously been lacking in the digital age. The salient fact is that despite
Snowden’s actions, the laws and policies that allowed the data collection in the first place have
changed very little, but the way the public interacts with the surveillance they are under has
changed with their awareness of it. For good or ill, society is now aware exactly the extent of the
surveillance they are subjected to and are able to interact with it in a way that vests a little more
power and agency in the subjects.
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Snowden and Panoptic Power
The few times a prison had been built under Bentham’s model, the design was flawed
enough to allow the prisoners within it to see their watchers at all times. The watchtower itself
was often built so that prisoners could see the guards’ comings and goings and even see the
guards watching them from inside, so they could know where the Inspector’s eye was focused at
any time. In the modern panopticon, the ambiguity of the Inspector was replaced with the
complete anonymity of the Inspector. Computer screens became the new one-way glass and
Venetian blinds, and the power of the panopticon shifted from its basis in an overt presence to
one of subtle social control. When Snowden released his data and documents, the panopticon
was revealed for what it was. The glass of the watchtower is still one-sided, but now the general
public knows that the watchtower exists. Unlike in the Benthamite model, where the power was
derived from the overt presence of the Inspector and the checks the knowledge of the Inspector’s
presence put on the subjects, the modern panopticon’s power was contingent on it being an
unknown and vague entity to better exercise its control. When people became aware of its
existence and the ways that it exercised power that relationship was destabilized, and the
panicking intelligence agencies had to act quickly to reestablish the power dynamic that they had
previously operated under. However, the immediate effect of the Snowden leaks on the general
populace was for people to become far more aware of the things they were sharing and the data
that they had put into various databases, creating an interesting parallel with the old forms of
panopticism. In the Benthamite panopticon, the use of the Inspector in the watchtower was to
induce self-surveillance in the subjects, making them put checks on their own behavior and
induce them to behave closer to the established norm. The subjects would gradually modify their
own behaviors and be disinclined to revolt for fear of the repercussions the Inspector would level
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against them should they be seen transgressing. The modern panopticon instead derived its
power from cataloguing transgressions and using them as red flags for targets to keep under
greater surveillance. Immediately after the general public was alerted to the presence of the
omnipresent watchtower, the self-surveillance of the traditional panopticon returned in force.
When Snowden made contact with the journalists that would spread the news of his
leaks, he enclosed a missive to them where he stated that his sole aim was to inform the public
what was being done in the name of security and how that was being done against their interests.
He hoped that the ensuing debate over mass surveillance of citizens would lead to policy reform,
but he also noted that he knew that many would seek to demonize him for his work (Greenwald,
pg 24). In a later communication to Greenwald, he would write “I understand that I will be made
to suffer for my actions and that the return of this information to the public marks my end. I will
be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon, and irresistible executive powers that
rule the world that I love are revealed even for an instant. […] I have been to the darkest corners
of the government, and what they fear is light” (Greenwald, pg 32). Whether Edward Snowden is
a patriot or a traitor is not the debate here. It is the task of history to either vindicate or condemn
him. It should be noted, however, that Snowden saw himself as a patriot, doing the work of the
greater good and serving the American people. Many would agree with him, with sixty percent
of people in their twenties believing that Snowden acted in the public interest (Von Cleave, pg
58). Still, the Snowden case is an ongoing affair, and it would be unwise to come down too
heavily on either side of the issue, at least until the dust settles.
Snowden is a man of conviction, and honestly believes that what he did was right. He
threw away a lucrative career, became a felon and breached security protocol because he truly
that the government he worked was spinning a narrative that was very different from the actions
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it was taking. He repeatedly emphasized to Greenwald while the two worked in Hong Kong that
his goal was never to destroy the NSA’s capability to eliminate privacy, saying that it was not his
role to make that choice. Going by his philosophy, deciding that on behalf of Americans as a
whole would make him no better than the institutions he was working against. Instead of
destroying them, he wanted to provide the public with the opportunity to decide for themselves
whether they ought to continue (Greenwald, pg 47). Once Greenwald and Snowden began
releasing the data they had compiled via The Guardian, the impact was immediate. It received
top billing on every news station and media outlet. The government rushed to say that the
measures being taken were vital for national security and to keep private citizens safe.
“Snowden’s great fear—that he would throw his life away for revelations nobody would care
about—had proven unfounded on the very first day” (Greenwald, pg 72), because the revelations
revealed to the public the full extent of the modern surveillance panopticon. The veil was not just
lifted, it was forcibly pulled back and the watchtower illuminated with powerful spotlights. The
outrage ensured that Snowden would not be forgotten or swept under a rug. By going public the
way he did, he made it impossible for the government to handle him quietly.
The Return to Self-Surveillance
Even if after the leaks the NSA continued to gather their information in much the same
way as they had before, the social structures that contribute to the accumulation of that
information were completely changed because of Snowden’s actions. The people became aware
of the Inspector and tried to monitor their behaviors accordingly, reverting back to the old
panoptic model. But on a more institutional and less theoretical level, the entire espionage
industry changed as well. “Some foreign customers [have] begun to reject American-made
technology because Snowden's leaks showed that the NSA had enlisted tech firms and secretly
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tapped their data-transfer hubs. Some companies are facing lawsuits from shareholders
demanding disclosure of any cooperation with NSA data-mining programs” (Dilanian). The
balance of power has shifted. For decades, the new panopticon has been allowed to flourish
under the new and emerging technologies that did away with the original model. The Inspectors
believed that they were impervious, and Edward Snowden proved them wrong. The modern
security apparatus can cut both ways, as the immediate aftermath of the leaks proved.
Though the average citizens of the modern day are in a virtually inescapable panopticon,
the role of the Inspector has now been revealed to them, and the way the Inspector watches has
likewise gone public. However, he also showed us that the Inspector is not always present, and in
revealing that the NSA had gathered such a comprehensive collection of data, he also showed
that the data was too massive to be sorted through. Although the data was being gathered, the
Inspector’s eye was not all-seeing and could only focus on specific things. Even on the slight
chance the lens was turned on someone, however briefly, it is entirely likely that the data
produced was lost in the tide of nearly identical data points. By destabilizing the power base of
the intelligence community, Edward Snowden has brought about a quiet and largely peaceful
revolution. There is nothing to stop the government and powerful mega-corporations from
gathering our data, but we are now aware exactly to the extent that they are doing so. While mass
surveillance is not technically a consensual relationship, the public now has the advantage of
being informed about what has happened behind closed doors and on the other side of computer
monitors. Snowden’s ultimate goal was simply to help people “turn away from reaction and fear
in favor of resilience and reason” (Ratcliffe). In the nearly three years since the original leaks,
progress has been made towards improving the safety of devices used for communication and
giving people more control as to what is shared with the watchers in the distant panopticon.
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Security is always an issue, especially in the post-September 11th world, and even as people take
charge of their data security, the overall consensus is that we need heightened security protocols
to protect ourselves and our interests. The post-Snowden sentiment seems to be “Don’t intrude,
but keep me safe”, and this is a delicate balance to walk.
Snowden the Traitor
Michelle Van Cleave, former head of United States counterintelligence under President
George W. Bush justifies the actions the NSA has taken both before Snowden and after, saying
that our top priority is the security of United States citizens, and that having systems, not people,
constantly analyzing data to detect patterns is one of the most effective tools to do this, and it is
the responsibility of the United States government to carry this out, subject to both internal
checks and congressional oversight. She writes that “To call Snowden a whistleblower demeans
the dignity o the term. As for the public’s right to know about these collection activities, we
already knew” (Van Cleave, pg 60). And she is, technically, correct. The public was told that
these surveillance activities were being carried out, and their data was subject to review by any
authorized party. The problem was that the average citizen did not know the extent of said
review. Many things that we assumed to be private were in fact open secrets to those with the
right clearance. The New Yorker’s Jeffery Toobin agrees with her, saying that any citizen of the
United States who has paid attention knows that the NSA’s sole purpose is to gather data and
intercept electronic communication. He calls Edward Snowden a “grandiose narcissist who
deserves to be in prison” (Toobin, June 10). He paints a portrait quite at odds with Glenn
Greenwald’s heroic whistleblower who took on the burden of proof for the sake of the public’s
well-being. Toobin instead characterizes Snowden as a sanctimonious criminal with a martyr
complex who “wasn’t blowing the whistle on anything illegal; he was exposing something that
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failed to meet his own standards of propriety” (Toobin, June 10) and sabotaging a program he
personally didn’t like at the expense of a powerful and tangible national security asset. While
Toobin does say that the NSA has admitted to sometimes going beyond its authority, Snowden
had no grounds for his actions because government surveillance on such a large scale as the NSA
was and currently is carrying out will be prone to human error and it is still unclear as to whether
or not the errors reported amount to a major violation of privacy, as Snowden claims (Toobin,
August 19). To Toobin, Snowden represents nothing more than an idealist who overstepped his
bounds and used the access he had been granted through service to the government to completely
jeopardize national security, a case not helped by his immediate flight to China and then
subsequently Russia, two of the most repressed and technologically sophisticated nations on
earth, not to mention the United States’ chief international rivals. Toobin is fairly incredulous
that neither Russia nor China would or could pass up the opportunity to exploit Snowden’s leaks,
despite Snowden’s assurances to the contrary. “China and Russia spend billions of dollars
conducting counterintelligence against the United States. An American citizen walks into their
countries bearing the keys to our most secret programs and both—both!—China and Russia
decline to even take a peek. That is a preposterous proposition” (Toobin, August 19).
The society we now live in relies on technology for tasks that range from the simplest
manufacturing work and household chores to the most sophisticated international espionage. The
effect of these technologies not just on government operations but also on the daily lives of
average citizens cannot be disputed. “Interconnected global networks of digital data have
become the single most important source of intelligence warning of threats, enabling our defense
at home and the advancement of freedom abroad. To say “hands off,” as some shortsighted
privacy advocates have been doing, will not preserve our liberties, it will endanger them. It
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should be possible for an enlightened citizenry to empower government action in that sphere
without forfeiting the very rights that our government exists to secure” (Van Cleave, pg 64).
However, the problem arises not from the fact that the government has access to citizens’ data.
The problem arises when people within the government have access to it. As stated in the
previous chapter, under present surveillance legislation, should any employee of an intelligence
community in America provide even the flimsiest justification for suspecting someone of vague
and possible threats, they can legally be granted access to all data concerning their suspect. As
Toobin notes, the NSA is not free from human error, and the agents of the NSA are human,
prone to human vices. While the information they gather is generally turned to the interests of
national security, there is nothing to stop them from using their considerable resources to follow
an old ex or to act against a particularly frustrating upstairs neighbor. Snowden was very upfront
in his justification for releasing his data, he did so because he saw that the information was being
abused. He and those that he worked with had access to the personal data of countless American
citizens, and power such as that begs to be abused. He made his decision to release the NSA files
because in doing so, he was not harming people, he was only harming abusive systems
(Greenwald, pg 43). Rather than jeopardizing the safety of operatives, he instead chose to
jeopardize the effectiveness of an operation, while still allowing the same operation to continue.
Ultimately, Snowden’s goal was not to topple the NSA or the panopticon, but to change the
relationship it had with those it subjected. Both Toobin and Van Cleave miss the point of what
Snowden did. He certainly acted selfishly and illegally, and perhaps Jeffery Toobin is right and
Snowden is nothing more than a textbook narcissist who wants everyone to be subjected to his
own definition of right and wrong. But the most important thing to come out of Snowden’s
revelations was the return of panoptic power to the Foucaultian model. With the subjects now
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fully aware of the Inspector’s presence and the gaze of the modern panopticon, the watchtower,
while still decentralized, became a more tangible thing and the relationship of the intelligence
community to the citizens it ostensibly protects became much more in line with what the
prisoners in the panoptic prison would have experienced with the gaolers. This has led to the rise
of self-surveillance, and an increase of monitoring and pruning one’s online and electronic
presence to better protect our privacy.
Snowden the Patriot
Despite what his detractors might say, Snowden himself is firmly convinced that his
actions were just and right. In fact, Edward Snowden is so morally unambiguous in his stance
that to do a character study of him is almost boring. In his own words, Edward Snowden “was
just ‘one small guy’, an ‘ordinary man’ who had seen the inner belly of the U.S. intelligence
apparatus and had to act” (Lippman). He had no ulterior motives for what he did, he only sought
to make the world a better place and to inform the public, and he fully accepted the
consequences, going so far as to say that even if he wound up in chains in Guantanamo Bay, he
had made his peace with that (Ratcliffe). Snowden’s goals were entirely altruistic, albeit slightly
quixotic. However, as Michelle Van Cleave points out in her defense of the NSA, sometimes it is
necessary for the Inspector to know things that other people don’t. The United States and Great
Britain were quick to condemn Snowden as a traitor, though charges have yet to be pressed
against Glen Greenwald and Laura Poitras, the journalist and documentary film maker he
originally established contact with in Hong Kong. Snowden believes that what he did was worth
it, and certainly he can justify his actions to himself and the global community. However, the
fact remains that he divulged government secrets to the public, and some things are kept secret to
keep us safe. The system was being abused, but for all the human error involved it was still

75
serving its role as a primarily defensive apparatus. Some of the information that he released was
sensitive and by revealing it publicly, enemies of the state could then use it against the state,
especially considering that Snowden sought refuge with the United States’ last major geopolitical
rivals. While Snowden’s actions are justifiable in the interest of the free spread of information
and the establishment of an informed public, in this instance the hidden modern panopticon
served a protective function. In destabilizing the information panopticon that Snowden felt
oppressed the subjects within it, he also destabilized that protective arm as well. This has been
the driving factor on what makes the Snowden case such a difficult issue. It is easy to build a
case for either side of the debate and be completely correct in calling one or the other morally
right. In returning power to the people, Snowden simultaneously eroded the very thing that was
protecting them.
Snowden singlehandedly shaped the course of discourse, and in doing so, shaped history.
One Guardian senior writer describes him as an “outlaw who rewrote the law”. He effectively
shifted the balance of power, but perhaps not in the way he originally intended. The sharing of
information has been opened to the wider public, and many manufacturers are now putting in
checks against the kind of monitoring the NSA performed before Snowden came forth with his
leaks. However, such data monitoring still happens, and despite the legislation put forth in the
months following, behind the language of legality and moral responsibility, the end result was a
temporary suspension of the NSA’s monitoring activities to allow the Senate to pass a bill ending
the bulk collection of phone data of American citizens (Naughton). Despite the reforms
introduced, the surveillance landscape remains remarkably unchanged from the months before
Snowden went public. Yes, the American government can no longer access bulk phone data, but
the large phone corporations still can and continue to. The government can still access them,
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though now they need to trip through the wires of the court system and obtain a warrant. And
this largely only applies to domestic surveillance. Very little has been done to curtail the
monitoring of the electronic presence of foreign citizens by the United States, much to the ire of
its allies. Modern legislation still struggles to catch up to the rapidly changing technological
landscape, and people continue to have difficulty deciding where the line between protection and
privacy should be drawn.
Snowden and Foucault
Perhaps it is best to question the justice and ethics of Snowden’s work in a larger context
and ask instead, can a political act of revolution be strengthened when it must justify itself on an
ethical ground? Unlike many of his structuralist and humanist contemporaries, the ethical
systems that Foucault wrote on were primarily politically motivated ones, motivated less by
morality and more by political discourse, calling them a concern with the kind of relationship
one ought to have with himself. Ethics were the way a being determined his moral consciousness
and how one composed and comported themselves though “Foucault was anything but a
moralist. He was even reviled as a nihilist […] Foucault was the opposite of those who find it
natural to talk ethics but difficult to take sides. He was someone who supported many struggles
yet found it next to impossible to speak the language of morality. He said the value of his work
should lie in its practical consequences and yet he refrained from saying what to do or how to
live” (Rajchman, pg 166). When examined through this lens, Edward Snowden’s actions seem to
fit the Foucaultian mold. He chose to act against the NSA and the American government due
largely to a sense of justice. Patriotism (or lack thereof) had very little to do with his ultimate
decision to share the information he had gathered with the world, should his statement be
believed. He seemed to have little interest in what actually happened to the information he
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shared, only that it went out to the public. Essentially, Snowden offered the global community a
choice, to continue on working under the assumption that their governments were working to
further their interests and protect them or to accept the invitation to step back and think critically
about the methods that those governments were employing and whether or not they had
overstepped. Whether that information was used for good or ill was largely irrelevant, all that
was important was that it was out there and that people could see the potential for abuse within
the system. Much like Snowden, Foucault sought “to offer not an ethics of absolute values, but a
set of expressive practices independent of any appeal to the absolute values offered by nature,
religion, tradition” (Luxon, pg 384), and much like Snowden, Foucault’s writing showed that
“despite the disciplinary forces of modern societies, docility is not inevitable; domination is not
unavoidable” (Crane, pg 304). When viewed through the Foucaultian lens, Edward Snowden’s
actions become ethical. He saw a problem that needed some form of action to rectify it, action
that he himself was prepared to take. He knew the consequences of the actions and accepted
them, and he acted according to the dictates of his conscience according to the path of action that
he felt would bring about the best possible end result for the community at large, if not for
himself personally. Foucault calls for resistance to domination, especially in his late work, and
Snowden issued a call to arms for the concerned citizens of the global community. “Foucault is
not primarily concerned with right conduct as the evaluations of actions of an individual, but
rather with the kind of collective that is implied by the history of an institution’s beginnings and
the regularization of its practices, for it is in the context of the collective’s identity that individual
decisions are made” (Moore, pg 89). In the Foucaultian lens, ethics refer to more than just the
decisions made at a given time, rather they are the lens upon which the reflection of events is
viewed, in short, ethics refers to the work of “establishing oneself as having a life by its
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reconstruction as a whole consisting of particular events and made intelligible by selected
commitments” (Moore, pg 88). Snowden’s aim was to change an obstructive and oppressive
system that he felt had its boot on the neck of the people. Foucault, conversely, was less
interested in change and more in the factors that drive change, in representing the nature of
discourse that shapes change and the way we view it. He treats institutions as being intrinsic and
decisive in the development of society, and the choices that shape the institutions shape us. The
way in which members of a collective respond to the history of events is the way those events
will continue to be constituted, and this will form the identity of those institutions and
collectives.
Edward Snowden was not a failure. He set out with the goal to reveal to the public the
extent to which the government was tracking them. He did precisely that, and in doing so
allowed the nation to enter into a discourse on privacy and security. He drew back the curtain
and allowed the American public to see that perhaps Oz was not so great and powerful after all.
He made us pay attention and sparked the revolution of the modern security state, and he
continues to offer commentary as the dust settles. But the problem with Snowden lies in his
naiveté. In statements put out by him, it becomes clear that his worldview is terribly black and
white. The government gathers personal data from people, and that is bad. The people should
have a right to see what is happening behind closed doors and how their data is being used, and
showing them is good. This obviously oversimplifies a complicated issue, and the most glaring
of its problems is that government surveillance and data collection do keep citizens safe and have
been effective in combatting threats to the country and its citizens. One of the primary aims of
the state is to keep its citizens safe, and in releasing his information, Snowden jeopardized that. It
is not as simple a matter that Big Brother is watching us, and that is something we need to fear.
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The rhetoric that enabled the sentiment that “Big Brother is watching out for you” was only
effective in the first place because there is truth to it. People can see the tangible effects of the
protection their invasion of privacy grants them, and that makes it easy to fall into complacency
regarding what the government is allowed to see and access.
Snowden will not burn out in obscurity, nor will the governments he opposed be able to
quietly dispose of him as he feared would happen in the days leading up to his leak to the
Guardian. He began a revolution, but that revolution is far from over. The institutions and
technologies that enabled the things that Edward Snowden fought against are still very much an
active force in global politics today, and their influence will continue to be exerted so long as
people continue to accept them as the norm. Snowden’s work has brought the world to a tipping
point where each member of society must make a choice, for good or ill. We can accept the
current regime in the interest of our own security and safety, or we can stand with Snowden to
look for alternatives that allow us to keep our privacy and live without fearing our government.
Conclusion
Edward Snowden has firmly established himself as a divisive figure, and though the dust
has largely begun to settle from his original leaks in 2013, it is rare to find someone who does
not have an opinion on him in one way or another. But to simplify his actions into right or
wrong, justified or illegal, is to commit the same fallacy that Snowden’s detractors level against
him. Snowden, for good or ill, appears to see the world in terms of black and white. Actions are
either moral or amoral, and if they are amoral, then someone ought to take actions to make them
moral. He operated according to the dictates of his conscience, and whether or not he is brought
to bear for those actions remains to be seen. However, the matter is not so simple as whether or
not his sharing the classified and sensitive information he gathered with the world. No, rather,

80
the true impact of Edward Snowden was to change the relationship of the public at large with the
surveillance apparatus. As has been stated, directly through Snowden’s actions the nature of
modern panoptic surveillance was completely changed, going from a decentralized and largely
anonymous global panopticon where the subjects were largely unaware that they were being
watched to one that functions more within the Foucaultian mode. Debates as to whether or not he
is guilty of a federal crime or even whether his actions were justified as a freedom fighter or he
was just acting as a sanctimonious narcissist are unable to see the forest for the trees.
Snowden changed the entire surveillance game. Whether one agrees with him or not, it is
clear that the system that was and still largely is in place allows for too many loopholes and vests
disproportionate power in those playing the role of Inspector. By adopting technologies that
allowed institutions like the NSA to collect and catalogue data largely without the American
public’s awareness, they acted in a way that violated constitutional rights and could have
potentially jeopardized America’s relationship with other global powers. Snowden blowing the
whistle allowed people to once again establish a proper panoptic relationship with the people on
the other side of the glass, learning once again how to engage in self-surveillance and to protect
themselves from intrusive government oversight Foucault’s conception of panoptic power drew
heavily not only on the gaze of the man in the watchtower, but also upon the subject’s awareness
of the gaze. Since the dawn of the digital age, the hierarchal powers that be have very
deliberately allowed the public to forget that there is someone on the other side of the screen, that
someone is watching them. By pulling down the curtain, Snowden was able to reestablish that
former conception of power that Foucault examined in “Discipline and Punish”. The power
structures and apparatuses that enabled it in the first place still exist, and largely the vagueness of
the legal discourse remains an issue. However, now the subjects are aware of it, and aware of the
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extent of it. The Inspectors in their metaphoric watchtowers, if they are to be believed, are only
looking out for those who pose a clear and present danger to society, but to identify those people
they must cross-reference data with many private citizens who have done no wrong and have no
intention to do wrong. It is not hard to see how Edward Snowden viewed this as a breach of a
social contract and an upset of the delicate balance of power established between the people and
their government of a supposedly free state.
The difficulty of panoptic power has always been the temptation to turn it towards
totalitarian means. The dystopic vision present to us by George Orwell is simply that temptation
carried to its logical extreme. However, as has been proved many times in the decade and a half
since September 11th, panoptic power can be effective as a shield for the people, protecting them
from threats even before those threats can be made manifest. There is a balance here that needs
to be kept, and Snowden reestablished that, doing what he thought was best for the people.
Whether or not Edward Snowden will be remembered as a hero or a traitor will be decided by
history.
What cannot be disputed is that at the very least, he will be remembered.
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